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IN THIS PAPER I am occupied with whether  recent changes in U.S. bank 
regulatory  policy have made the Federal Reserve less effective as a 
central  bank  than it was. In passing, I am also occupied with how U.S. 
regulatory  policy may change over the years immediately  ahead and 
with  whether,  depending  on how the  policy  changes,  the Federal  Reserve 
is going to end up less effective than  it is at present. 
For me, effective has a very narrow  meaning:  the Federal  Reserve is 
effective to  the extent that, by  means of  (domestic) open market 
operations,  it can in some appropriate  sense control  the nominal  gross 
national  product  of the United States. Instead  of nominal  GNP, I might, 
of course, have chosen real  GNP  as the Federal  Reserve's  target  variable 
or, alternatively,  the average  of prices  of all  goods and  services  currently 
produced by resident companies. Most would agree, however, that 
nominal  GNP responds,  if perhaps  with a lag, even to a fully anticipated 
change in the Federal Reserve's portfolio  of Treasury  securities or, in 
other  words, to a fully anticipated  official  open market  operation.  And 
by choosing  nominal  GNP, I avoid the question  of how its components, 
real GNP and the GNP deflator,  respond to anticipated  and unantici- 
pated  changes  in the Federal  Reserve's portfolio  of Treasury  securities. 
The Federal Reserve is  not limited to engaging in open market 
operations.  It can try to influence  U.S. nominal  GNP by, for example, 
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changing  discount rates or the required  reserves ratio. We can also 
imagine  it  engaging  in "open  mouth"  operations  or, as in 1966,  attempting 
by threat  to persuade  banks to do this or that. It seems to me, though, 
that  most Federal  Reserve officials  and  knowledgeable  outsiders  believe 
that nominal  GNP should be controlled  by official  open market  opera- 
tions. That is why I define effective as I do. 
There  is another  definition  to be highlighted.  In  part  because  regulatory 
policy has been changed, differences  in classes of U.S. financial  inter- 
mediaries  are not nearly  as pronounced  as they were. It is now at best 
extremely difficult  to distinguish  between the commercial  banks and 
savings and loan associations (S&Ls) doing business in the United 
States, except by appeal  to niceties  of law that  as a practical  matter  mean 
precious little. I thus think  of the U.S. banking  industry  as being made 
up of all of the federally and state-chartered  S&Ls (and  for what little 
they add, the savings banks) in the United States, federally  and state- 
chartered  U.S. commercial  banks, and  U.S .-based  commercial  banking 
subsidiaries  of foreign banking  organizations.  Although  on occasion it 
will be necessary to refer specifically  to commercial  banks  or to S&Ls, 
I mean  both when I use the word banks  without  qualification. 
In the section of the paper that follows immediately, I consider 
whether government  regulation  of banks is necessary for an effective 
central  bank. Thereafter  I review relevant  recent changes  in U.S. bank 
regulatory  policy and go into whether those changes have made the 
Federal  Reserve any less effective than  it was. To conclude, I speculate 
about U.S. regulatory  policy of the years immediately  ahead  and about 
whether  the most likely changes  in policy will make  the Federal  Reserve 
less effective than  it is now. 
In the first  section of the paper  I argue  that  there  must  be government 
regulation  if the central  bank  is to be effective, able, that  is, by means  of 
open market  operations  to influence  nominal  GNP, and that  the type of 
government-imposed  restriction required depends on the payments 
technology being used.  ' That proposition  is to be read as a warning,  at 
1. As may  be apparent,  the  phrase  "by  means  of open  market  operations"  is important. 
Since other ways of influencing  nominal  GNP may exist, there is no implication  that 
government-imposed  restrictions  are in general  necessary. Indeed, Hall has proposed 
paying  interest  on required  reserves and using the rate paid to influence  nominal  GNP. 
See Robert E.  Hall, "Optimal  Fiduciary  Monetary  Systems," Journal of Monetary 
Economics,  vol. 12 (July 1983),  pp. 33-50. But it is no part  of my purpose  to decide how 
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least  by those who are  ideologically  disposed  toward  laissez faire.  Under 
the laissez faire  banking  policy, nominal  GNP is beyond  the reach  of the 
central  bank that is limited to engaging  in open market  operations.  To 
put  the point  another  way, under  the laissez faire  policy any  official  open 
market  operation  is without  effect. 
In the second section I review and  appraise  recent  relevant  change  in 
U.S. bank  regulatory  policy. And  relevant is to be stressed  because most 
of the changes  in that  policy have no bearing  on the effectiveness of the 
Federal Reserve. Geographic  restrictions  come immediately  to mind. 
They have been eased somewhat, but even if eliminated  the Federal 
Reserve would not now be any more or less effective than it was. I 
therefore consider only those parts of policy governing  bank interest 
payments to depositors and the activities in which banks (and bank 
holding  companies)  may engage. Going  beyond bank  regulatory  policy, 
I also appraise  the much-publicized  emergence of the nonbank  banks 
or, to use a phrase  that  anyone  who still cares  about  our  language  should 
prefer,  the loophole  banks.  I conclude  that  despite  potentially  significant 
changes in policy and the emergence of loophole banks, the Federal 
Reserve  is in at least one sense not appreciably  less effective than  it was. 
There  is the  possibility,  though,  of the  Federal  Reserve  being  unwilling 
to control nominal  GNP. What if it is confronted  by, for example, an 
incipient  financial  crisis? I am far from sure that the Federal  Reserve, 
although  a lender of last resort with responsibility  for what happens  to 
nominal  GNP, can ever find  itself torn. But if it can, then, as I argue  in 
the last section of the paper,  easing or eliminating  government-imposed 
restrictions  may make  it less effective. In that  connection,  the important 
question  is what Congress and the regulatory  agencies do in the years 
ahead  and,  more  specifically,  how they manage  the  potential  for  riskiness 
in banking. 
The Need for Government Regulation 
In this section I argue that government  regulation  is necessary if a 
central  bank  is to be able  to influence  nominal  GNP  by exchanging  bonds 
for currency or currency for bonds. (For now, that is what effective 
means:  being able to influence  nominal  GNP.) I also argue  that the type 
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technology  being  used. I do not really  establish  either  proposition,  since 
all I do is consider  a few specific  payments  technologies.  I am, however, 
seeking  only plausibility.  Moreover,  the assumed  payments  technology 
of the first subsection would seem a good approximation  of that being 
used currently  in the United States. Its distinguishing  characteristic  is 
that, just as in the United States of the present, some purchases are 
made  with currency. 
THE  SUPPLY  OF  CURRENCY 
I find  it convenient to define  intermediation  as making  small-denom- 
ination  claims out of large-denomination  claims or as substituting  small 
for large-denomination  claims. To illustrate,  a private-sector  company 
buys a ninety-day  bearer  claim on the government,  a claim  with face or 
maturity  value  of $  10,000,  and  then sells 10,000  ninety-day  bearer  claims 
to the large-denomination  government  claim, each with a face value of 
$1. Presently  it will be necessary to go into what the buying  and selling 
prices are. Here, though, it suffices to note that in doing what it was 
described  as doing  the private-sector  company  is not  only intermediating 
but also supplying  a tangible  means  of payment  or currency,  an alterna- 
tive to the government-issued  or official  currency. 
But if private-sector  companies are free to intermediate  or supply 
currency,  then nothing  of any consequence  follows from  an official  open 
market  operation.2  The central  bank  is ineffective. The precise meaning 
offree to intermediate  may be apparent:  there  is unimpeded  (zero-cost) 
entry into and exit from  the private-sector  intermediation  industry.  For 
a central  bank to be ineffective, it must also be assumed, though, that 
intermediation  is a constant average-cost activity.3  And, further, the 
government's cost of intermediating  must be identical to the private 
sector's cost. But that last assumption  seems innocuous; even when 
there  is great  incentive,  keeping  a technology  secret  is near  to impossible. 
2. I borrow  from Neil Wallace, "A Legal Restrictions  Theory of the Demand  for 
'Money' and the Role of Monetary  Policy," Quarterly  Review of the Federal Reserve 
Bank  of Minneapolis,  vol. 7 (Winter  1983),  pp. 1-7. 
3. If x > y, then issuing  x small-denomination  claims,  each with  face value  z/x, where 
z is the face value of the large-denomination  claim, must cost more  than  issuing  y small- 
denomination  claims,  each with  face value  z/y. The constant  average  cost is, however,  for 
the issue of a given  number  of small-denomination  claims,  say n. So the assumption  is that 
if issuing  n claims  against  a large-denomination  claim  costs c dollars,  then  issuing  2n  claims 
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We can suppose that any private-sector  company engaged  in inter- 
mediation  sells its small-denomination  claims, those with face value of 
$1, for $1 each.4 Because no interest is paid on official currency, it is 
therefore  possible for those claims to be used along with the official 
currency  in making  purchases. The private-sector  company  does not, 
however, buy the large-denomination  claim on the government for 
$10,000.  Rather,  it pays something  less, for its margin  is the difference 
between the $10,000  face value and the price paid. Free entry and exit 
tell us the equilibrium  price and margin.  In equilibrium  the price is less 
than  the $10,000  face value  by the cost of intermediation,  that  cost being 
defined  as including  a normal  profit.5 
There is a strong implication:  with a private-sector  intermediation 
industry  characterized  by unimpeded  entry  and  exit, the nominal  rate  of 
interest on ninety-day large-denomination  claims on the government 
cannot be just any number, large or small, depending, say, as Irving 
Fisher would have had us believe, on the expected rate of inflation. 
Independent  of the expected rate of inflation,  the nominal  rate is equal 
to the cost of intermediating.6  It follows that a central  bank  purchase  of 
a large-denomination  ninety-day  claim  on the government,  paid  for with 
official currency, has no effects. For the purchase  to have effects, the 
nominal interest rate on ninety-day claims on the government  would 
have to change;  being  fixed  by the cost of intermediating,  it cannot. 
Sketching  the response of the private-sector  intermediation  industry 
to, for example, an official  purchase  of a ninety-day  large-denomination 
claim  on the government  may  help understanding.  Imagine  that  with the 
purchase the nominal rate on ninety-day claims decreases, if only 
momentarily. With the decrease, no private-sector intermediary  is 
earning  the competitive rate of return,  so there is incentive for exiting 
4. The  assumption,  far  from  innocent,  will  be challenged.  Note, though,  that  whatever 
the government  may insist on, private-sector  claims (currency)  can in effect be used to 
pay taxes. Also, those claims can be regarded  as perfectly  safe or riskless. There  is the 
possibility  of fraud,  but  official  currency  can be counterfeited. 
5. The difference  between  face or maturity  value and the equilibrium  purchase  price 
is the quantity  c in note 3. 
6. That  is true  for any rate, not  just the rate  on ninety-day  claims  on the government. 
Seemingly,  one gets a different  ninety-day  rate  if large-denomination  claims  are,  as it  were, 
broken  up by private-sector  companies  into claims  with face values of $10, not $1. That, 
however,  is not right.  With  private-sector  intermediation,  prices  must  reflect  costs. What 
prevents  that from being apparent  is the practice  of the Federal  Reserve. Despite the 
difference  in unit costs, it is willing  to supply  ten $1 Federal  Reserve Notes in exchange 
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the industry.  With  immediate  exit a possibility, we might  even suppose 
that  the  central  bank  purchases  an  exiting  company's  large-denomination 
claim  and  that  the note-holders  of that  exiting  company  are  paid  off with 
the newly issued official currency. The private  economy's portfolio  is 
then  exactly  what  it was, and  the nominal  rate  on ninety-day  government- 
issued claims  of large  denomination  increases  to what it was originally. 
The argument  just made also establishes that a central  bank's open 
market sale of a government-issued  claim of large denomination  is 
without  effects. Thus, with a payments  technology  involving  the use of 
currency and a private-sector  intermediation  industry  possessed of a 
constant average-cost production  technology and without barriers  to 
entry  or exit, the central  bank  is ineffective, unable  to influence  nominal 
GNP.7 
No one knows for sure  how close intermediation  is in reality  to being 
a constant average-cost activity. Essentially constant average cost is, 
however, an appealing  a priori  assumption,  perhaps  the most appealing. 
And because Federal Reserve Notes are currently  being used, it is 
therefore  not implausible  that a prohibition  on private-sector  interme- 
diation  is necessary  for an effective Federal  Reserve. 
OTHER  PAYMENTS  TECHNOLOGIES 
A prohibition  on private-sector intermediation  is not likely to be 
passively accepted. For any private-sector  company, the appearance 
must  be that  there  is considerable  gain  to be had  from  getting  around  the 
prohibition. (Remember  that the effect of the prohibition  is to free 
nominal  interest rates from their cost-of-intermediation  bound.) And if 
paying  by check is not more costly than  paying  with currency,  there is 
no need for private-sector intermediation.  By providing third-party 
7. It is possible to establish  that proposition  by a different  argument,  one much  like 
that  used to prove  Modigliani-Miller  irrelevance.  See Neil Wallace,  "A Modigliani-Miller 
Theorem  for  Open-Market  Operations,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 71 (June  1981), 
pp. 267-74. See also Christophe  Chamley  and  Herakles  Polemarchakis,  "Assets, General 
Equilibrium  and  the Neutrality  of Money,"  Review  of Economic  Studies,  vol. 51 (January 
1984),  pp. 129-38.  Chamley  and  Polemarchakis  claim  that  only  official  purchases  and  sales 
of real  capital  are  without  effects. Supposedly,  traditional  official  open market  operations 
do matter.  They are vague, though,  as Wallace  and other  colleagues  have pointed  out in 
conversation,  on how they get currency  and bonds to coexist. And it is a reasonable 
conjecture  that when they are explicit on coexistence, they will get the result  obtained 
from the private-sector  intermediation  argument-that the claims  the central  bank  buys 
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payments  for customers,  a private-sector  company  supplies  all  the small- 
denomination  means of payment  required.  The incentive  is therefore  to 
make  paying  by check a better substitute  for those purchases  currently 
being made with currency.  Perhaps  we should  not have been surprised 
by the introduction  of credit cards; they allow users to write certified 
checks. 
In the United States, private-sector  intermediation  has long been 
prohibited:  under the National Currency  Act of 1863,  a 10 percent  tax 
was imposed  on private  bank  notes other  than  those issued by federally 
chartered  commercial  banks, and any statute that makes a particular 
activity unprofitable  is de facto a prohibition.8  Also, a while after the 
note-issuing Federal Reserve System was established, the Treasury 
retired  the last of its securities  that  under  the National  Currency  Act (or 
the National  Bank  Act of 1864)  could  be used as backing  for outstanding 
bank notes. If the argument  of the previous section is right, we should 
then expect to see currency  disappear,  not necessarily  from portfolios 
but as a means of payment. And we should want to consider  whether, 
with  a payments  technology  involving  no use of currency,  a government- 
imposed  restriction  is necessary  for an effective central  bank. To do so, 
we must  assume that  all purchases  are made  by check.9 
Of course, there  are checks and  there  are checks; there  are the paper 
checks of the present,  and  there  are the electronic  checks that  will come 
to dominate  in a near or a far future. Over the past decade or so there 
has been much experimenting  with point-of-sale  terminals  and in what 
has come to be called home banking.  Indeed, two of the largest U.S. 
banks  would  almost  certainly  insist  that  they are  not  experimenting  with, 
but are actually engaged in, home banking.'0  A paper-free  payments 
8. As Arthur  Rolnick  has pointed  out to me, the tax was repealed  with  the passage  of 
the "deadwood  bill," an appendage  of the Tax  Reform  Act of 1976.  Since  January  1, 1977, 
the United  States  has  thus  been  without  the 10  percent  tax on notes  issued  by, for  example, 
state-chartered  commercial  banks. According  to a Senate  report  on the Tax Reform  Act 
of 1976,  the Senate  was advised  by the Office  of the Comptroller  of the Currency  that  the 
tax was no longer  needed. Evidently,  there are various  provisions  of federal  law under 
which issuing  bank notes would be illegal. Unfortunately,  none of those provisions  are 
given  in the Senate  report.  If we are lucky, we will one day find  out whether  counsel  for 
the  Office  of the Comptroller  of the Currency  made  a mistake. 
9. For  an  excellent  description  of how  payments  might  be made  in  an  economy  without 
currency  (a tangible  means  of payment),  see Eugene  F. Fama,  "Banking  in the Theory  of 
Finance,"  Journal of Monetary Economics,  vol. 6 (January  1980),  p. 42. 
10. Bank  of America  and  Chemical  Bank.  For a report  on home  banking,  see "Home 
Banking:  The  Growing  Infant,"  American Banker, July  23, 1984,  p. 1. 412  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
technology  involving  the use of point-of-sale  terminals  and  personal  and 
super computers would thus seem right now to be technologically 
feasible. We sit waiting  only for costs to decrease sufficiently.  The price 
histories  of various  goods, pocket calculators  included,  provide  consid- 
erable  reassurance  that somewhere  along  the way they will, but exactly 
when cannot  be predicted  with confidence. 
Here, fortunately,  it is of no consequence whether  the checks used 
for payments are paper or electronic. The question is whether check- 
writing  has become universal.  Even if we assume (as above I indicated 
we must) that currency is not used in making  purchases, it does not 
follow  that  currency,  although  dominated  by check  writing,  is necessarily 
without value. The implication  is rather  that, independent  of whether 
currency  has value, a government-imposed  restriction  is necessary for 
an effective central  bank. 
The case of currency  having  no value is the easier to argue.  Since an 
official  open market  operation  involves exchanging  currency  (or, equiv- 
alently, transactions  balances of banks or companies and individuals) 
for interest-bearing  Treasury securities, such an operation must be 
without significant  effects. Changing  the supply of anything  free can 
hardly  have earth-shaking  consequences."I  Thus  do we come to the need 
for a government-imposed  restriction  and, more  particularly,  a govern- 
ment-imposed  demand  for currency. A currency  reserve requirement 
imposed by government  must of necessity be binding;  so, with such a 
requirement,  currency has value and official open market  operations 
have significant  effects. Further,  if considerations  of equity  and  resource 
allocation are ignored, it does  not matter on which companies or 
individuals  the currency  reserve requirement  is imposed.  12 
Above, I suggested  that even if currency  is inferior  to check writing 
for all purchases,  it can still  have value;  that, I believe, is what  economic 
theory  tells us. If in every period  there  is net saving, then there must  be 
a transfer  of consumption  from  any one period  to the next. The transfer 
is managed  by the holding  of assets, and, should  there  be some available, 
currency  may be used. If it is, then it must be valuable;  it must have a 
positive, although not necessarily constant, price. But if currency is 
being used to transfer consumption, then, again, the central bank is 
11. Note the assumption  that the central  bank  is the monopoly  supplier  of currency. 
With  currency  having  no value, it is bound  to be. 
12. Fama considers a (paper)  currency  reserve requirement  imposed  on owners of 
space ships. See his "Banking  in the Theory  of Finance,"  p. 56. John H.  Kareken  413 
ineffective.  3 The  nominal  rate  on currency  is zero, and  the nominal  rates 
on all assets used to transfer  consumption  must, after  risk  adjustments, 
be identical; and as I argued  earlier, with nominal  rates on all assets 
other than currency  being given by the nominal  rate on currency, the 
central bank cannot be effective. Here, the explanation  is that with 
nominal  interest  rates  all being  identical,  the private  sector  does not care 
about  the composition  of its asset portfolio;  and not caring,  it passively 
accepts  any change  in composition,  even one induced  by an official  open 
market  operation. 
If currency  is being used as a means of payment  or in making  some 
kinds  of purchases,  then, as I noted  previously,  the effect of a prohibition 
on private-sector  intermediation  is to free  nominal  interest  rates  on other 
assets from the nominal interest rate on currency and, moreover, in 
freeing  those rates, to make the central  bank  effective. If, on the other 
hand, currency  is not being used as a means  of payment  but rather  only 
to transfer  consumption,  then, as when it has no value, the analogue  of 
the prohibition  is a currency  reserve requirement.  With  such a require- 
ment, nominal  rates on all other  assets can, as it were, wander  from  the 
nominal  rate on currency, and in consequence an official  open market 
operation  can influence  nominal  GNP. 
I have argued that without government  regulation,  a central bank 
must be ineffective, unable to influence  nominal  GNP. If that is right, 
then obviously no one who counts on the Federal  Reserve to influence 
nominal GNP (or any other aggregate) by  means of  open market 
operations  should  advocate the ultimate  in deregulation.  14 
Deregulation and the Federal Reserve 
I turn now to whether, with U.S.  bank regulatory  policy having 
changed,  the Federal  Reserve is less effective as a central  bank than it 
13. In discussing  the case of valueless currency,  I did not mention  nominal  interest 
rates. If what we mean by a nominal  interest  rate is (the usual simple  transform  of) the 
ratio of period t  +  1 and period t currency  prices, then, with valueless currency,  all 
nominal  rates are undefined.  With  valueless currency,  a numeraire  other than currency 
might  well be used. Suppose  it is gold. Then  nominal  rates  on other  assets are not tied in 
any  simple  way to the nominal  rate  on gold. 
14. That  I failed  to consider  a payments  technology  involving  the use of currency  for 
only a very few kinds  of purchases  may be held against  me. My guess is that how many 
purchases  are made  per unit time with currency  makes  no difference.  Either  currency  is 
used  as a means  of payment  or it is not. 414  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1984 
was. That  being  what  is at issue, I must  abandon  the  definition  of effective 
I have been using. I begin  in this section by appraising  the claim  that  the 
Federal Reserve is more effective with than without restrictions on 
interest rates paid by banks. And in making my appraisal  I use the 
definition  of effective implicit  in the arguments  of those who have made 
that  claim. I do not suggest  a common  definition.  Implicit  in nearly  all if 
not all of the arguments,  though, are definitions  in which reduced-form 
multipliers  appear:  for example,  that  which  tells us the effect of a ceteris 
paribus change in some market-determined  interest rate on nominal 
GNP; or, to give another example, that which tells us the effect on 
nominal  GNP of a ceteris paribus  change in, say, total bank reserves. 
But given how I test the claim that (potentially)  binding  interest rate 
restrictions  enhance the effectiveness of the Federal  Reserve, it makes 
no difference  which multiplier  is used. 
Using a reduced-form  multiplier  to measure  the effectiveness of the 
Federal Reserve is, more likely than not, silly. To date no one has 
provided  a compelling  brief  for the existence of a constraint  on the rate 
of change  of the Federal  Reserve's portfolio  of Treasury  securities;  and 
without  a constraint,  it is without  significance  that  a multiplier  gets larger 
or smaller. In fairness, I do have to add that zero is a very special 
multiplier  value. But it is doubtful  indeed that among  those who would 
maintain  restrictions  on interest rates paid by banks  there are any who 
believe such restrictions  are  necessary  for an effective Federal  Reserve. 
The point to be stressed, however, is that I cannot be blamed for a 
definition  chosen by the advocates of bank interest  rate restrictions  or 
for using that  definition,  however silly, in appraising  their  claim. 
Once having appraised  the claim, I go on to what strikes me as an 
interesting  possibility:  that the Federal  Reserve may not now be as free 
as previously it was to attend single-mindedly  to controlling  the target 
variable  of choice (which  here is nominal  GNP) or that at some point in 
the future it may not be as free as it is at present. That  is to say, being 
able  in some sense to control  a target  variable  such  as nominal  GNP may 
not suffice. To be effective, perhaps  a central  bank has to be not only 
able but also willing. 
REGULATORY  POLICY:  INTEREST  RATE  RESTRICTIONS 
Whether  to have binding  (Regulation  Q-type) restrictions  or limits  on 
rates paid by commercial  banks was debated  during  the 1960s,  at least 
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commercial  bank  disintermediation  as the  only  way or, more  reasonably, 
the quickest way of influencing  the rate of inflation.  They were not a 
majority.  (In mid-1966  the Federal Reserve did change to a policy of 
forced disintermediation,  but out of a narrow  concern  for S&Ls and, at 
one remove, the residential  construction  industry.)  But their  argument 
was in essence this: to spend, companies  must  borrow,  and  they borrow 
from  banks;  hence, if banks  cannot lend, companies  cannot spend, and 
aggregate  demand  is less than it otherwise would be. Companies  must 
of course be interpreted  as including  households wanting to acquire 
residential  housing;  and banks must be interpreted  as including  S&Ls, 
which during  the 1960s  were important  originators  and holders of resi- 
dential  mortgage  loans. 
There is an obvious rejoinder  to the argument  just given, one that 
highlights  its incompleteness:  as financial  intermediaries,  banks  are not 
necessary, only convenient; they can be bypassed, if at some cost. Or 
to put  the rejoinder  another  way: if binding  interest  rate  restrictions  keep 
lenders  from  favoring  banks, there  is nothing,  risk  aside (for  which they 
can  be compensated),  to prevent  them  from  lending  directly  to companies 
wanting  to borrow  and spend. 
It may be granted  that when rate restrictions  are for the first time 
made binding, some companies long accustomed to borrowing  from 
banks will not find loans. Any company can be caught off guard. But 
more than once? Companies  that have been surprised  will make sure 
that  they have borrowing  alternatives.  When  rate restrictions  are made 
binding  a second time, the response  will therefore  not be what  it was the 
first  time. 
Restrictions on rates paid by banks have for all practical  purposes 
been eliminated.  Now, however, we are hearing  appeals, mostly from 
Wall Street-which  must be more a state of mind than a place-to 
reimpose  the restrictions.  15 So we must  look  to history  for  what  it reveals. 
15. Among those who have urged  the reimposition  of restrictions  on rates paid by 
banks,  Wojnilower  stands  apart.  He has made  far  and  away  the  most  forceful  case for  what 
he and others seek. See Albert M. Wojnilower,  "Stabilize Banking:  Restore Some 
Controls,"  New York  Times,  July 18, 1984,  p. A23. Interestingly,  though,  he is also the 
one who has documented  so well that "interruptions  in the supply  of (bank)  credit" or 
"credit crunches" spawn financial  innovations. See his "The Central  Role of Credit 
Crunches  in Recent Financial  History,"  BPEA,  2:1980,  pp. 278, 288-89. But that  he can 
reasonably  argue  from history as he has and also urge the reimposition  of interest  rate 
restrictions  on depository  institutions  is not at all clear.  If financial  market  participants  are 
as innovative  as he has suggested, then to reimpose rate restrictions  on depository 
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The  first  task  is to determine  when,  if ever, forced  bank  disintermediation 
was official  policy. The second task, assuming  there was a time when 
bank  disintermediation  was deliberately  engineered,  is to compare  that 
time with its post-World War  II complement  in a search  for a change  in 
economic structure. 
Dating Forced Intermediation. Authority  to limit  interest  rates  paid 
by Federal  Reserve member  banks  was granted  the Board  of Governors 
of the Federal  Reserve System (hereafter  the Federal  Reserve Board)  in 
the Banking  Act of 1933. And it wasted no time in the exercise of that 
authority;  a maximum  rate  of 3 percent  applicable  to all types of savings 
and time deposits became effective on November 1, 1933.  Authority  to 
limit interest rates paid by insured  nonmember  commercial  banks was 
granted the  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  (FDIC) in the 
establishing statute and put beyond challenge by the Banking  Act of 
1935. Shortly after the passage of that act, the Federal  Reserve Board 
and  the FDIC set maximum  rates of 2.5 percent  to be effective January 
1, 1936.  And, what  seems most  amazing  now, those maximum  rates  were 
held unchanged  until  year-end  1956. 
Not once in the twenty-one  years  from  1936  to 1956  did  the 2.5 percent 
maximum  rates  limit  the  banks  subject  to them.  Those  banks  experienced 
forced disintermediation  for the first time in the fall of 1959, and then 
only briefly. In hindsight  that disintermediation  appears  as an isolated 
instance. There could of course have been more instances, but in each 
of the years from 1962  to 1965  the Federal  Reserve Board  and  the FDIC 
increased  their  maximum  rates. 
The increases of December 1965 had a most pronounced effect. 
During  early 1966  insured commercial  banks took advantage  of them; 
able to raise rates actually  paid, they took deposits from S&Ls, which 
were constrained  not by maximum  rates but by their  portfolios  of long- 
term  fixed-rate  assets. The transfer  of deposits, effected with a seeming 
ease, badly  frightened  some regulatory  agency officials  and  members  of 
Congress,  and as a result a new statute  was enacted in September  1966 
that  among  other  things  authorized  the Federal  Home Loan  Bank  Board 
to set maximum  rates for insured  S&Ls.16 
16. In 1969,  the authority  of the Federal  Home Loan Bank  Board  was broadened  by 
making  all S&Ls, the uninsured  included,  subject  to its maximum  rates. And uninsured 
commercial  and savings banks  were made subject  to maximum  rates established  by the 
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In  passing  its 1966  statute,  Congress  changed  the  purpose  of maximum 
deposit rates and, by implication,  the strategy  for administering  those 
rates.  In 1933  it was widely  believed  that  so-called  excessive competition 
among commercial banks was in considerable  part the cause of the 
financial  crisis of 1930-33. And when the Federal Reserve Board and 
the FDIC were first granted authority  to limit rates paid by insured 
commercial  banks, the intent was to have those agencies limit such 
competition.  When  authority  was granted  the Federal  Home Loan  Bank 
Board, however, and an Interagency Coordinating  Committee was 
established  to maintain  appropriate  differences  between the maximum 
rates for commercial  banks and S&Ls, the intent  was to protect S&Ls 
and  thereby  the residential  construction  industry.  To prevent  excessive 
competition  (whatever  that  may  be) among  commercial  banks,  it suffices 
to keep maximum  rates  just above the actual  average  rates  being  paid  by 
commercial  banks. To protect S&Ls, however, it may be necessary to 
have binding  maximum  rates  for commercial  banks. 
In sum, September  1966  appears  to be a good choice for the start  of 
the period  when forced disintermediation  was official  policy. A slightly 
better choice, though, is July 1966. That is when the Federal  Reserve 
Board  and the FDIC anticipated  Congress  in its change  of purpose:  the 
two agencies decreased some maximum  rates, thereby  subjecting  com- 
mercial banks to  disintermediation  presumably to keep them from 
offering  depositors  more  than  S&Ls could pay. 
There are several possibilities for the date when forced disinterme- 
diation  ceased to be official  policy, and not one of them  is plainly  better 
than  the others. The most obvious choice is October  1983,  at the end of 
which maximum  rates were for practical  purposes  eliminated.  Between 
June 1970 and October 1983, though, banks, commercial  banks espe- 
cially, were granted  more and more funding  freedom. So when to end 
the period  that interests  us is, alas, a matter  of judgment.  A case can be 
made for December 1982. In November 1982 Congress created the 
Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  Committee  as the successor to the 
Interagency  Coordinating  Committee.  With virtually  no delay the new 
committee  authorized  a new  liability  for  banks,  the  money  market  deposit 
account. In December 1982, it authorized  another new liability, the 
Super  NOW (negotiable  order  of withdrawal)  account.  And by its order 
there  were to be no maximum  rates  for money market  deposit  and  Super 
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of 1982, then, banks had become more than able to deal with money 
market  mutual  funds. That is apparent  from the time series of the total 
assets of those funds. 
There are other possible dates between June 1970 and December 
1982:  for example, May 1978,  which is when the money market  certifi- 
cate was authorized.  To be sure, the case for  December  1982  is in a sense 
more  persuasive. When  the Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  Com- 
mittee  authorized  the money market  deposit  and  Super  NOW  accounts, 
it did not tell banks  to stop issuing money market  certificates.  At issue, 
however, is when banks were granted  sufficient  funding  freedom, and 
my instinct is to say June 1970, at which time maximum  rates for, or 
restrictions  on, rates paid owners of large-denomination  certificates  of 
deposit with 30-day to 89-day maturities  were suspended, never to be 
reimposed.  My choice of ending  date  may seem eccentric,  but  recall  that 
we are especially interested  in the period  when large  commercial  banks 
were being  deliberately  subjected  to disintermediation.  17 
Testing  for Structural  Change. If it is right that the availability  of 
credit, particularly  from large  commercial  banks, matters  greatly, then 
for the United States the post-World  War  II period  cannot  be of a piece. 
Banks  operating  in the United States were more  limited  by government- 
imposed interest rate restrictions  during  the subperiod  July 1966-June 
1970  than they were either  before or after. That  is especially true  of the 
large  commercial  banks. And the economic relationships  of that subpe- 
riod should  differ  from  those of the surrounding  subperiods. 
To check on whether the economic relationships  of the indicated 
subperiods  do differ I tested for structural  change using Litterman's 
procedure,  the justification  for which can be briefly  stated.  18 We know 
17. Wojnilower  has been represented  by commentators  as stressing  the availability  of 
credit. To illustrate,  I quote from Benjamin  Friedman's  comments  that appeared  with 
Wojnilower's  "The Central  Role of Credit  Crunches,"  p. 328: "[Wojnilower's]  story of 
the business  cycle peak . ..  is one of availability  effects rather  than  interest  rate  effects, 
and  of the credit  market  rather  than  the money  market."  Friedman's  synopsis  is mislead- 
ingly  incomplete.  Wojnilower  stresses not the availability  of credit  but the availability  of 
commercial  bank credit. Throughout  his paper  he is almost  exclusively concerned  with 
the supply  of credit  from  large  commercial  banks. 
18. Robert  B. Litterman,  "The Costs of Intermediate  Targeting,"  Research  Depart- 
ment  Working  Paper  254  (Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Minneapolis,  May 1984).  The descrip- 
tion  of the test procedure  given  in appendix  A below  is a little  more  precise  than  that  which 
follows here in the text. For a discussion  of forecasting  with vector autoregressions  but 
estimated  using  a particular  Bayesian  method,  a  discussion  which  is nothing  if  not  complete, 
see Thomas  Doan,  Robert  Litterman,  and  Christopher  Sims,  "Forecasting  and  Conditional 
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that, with no structural  change, adding  observations  must on average 
result in an improved  forecast. So it is possible to test for structural 
change by comparing  forecasts, one generated  by more observations 
than  the other. Suppose for the moment  that there  is only one variable. 
Think  of R(I) as being  the variance  of the forecast  of the kth  observation 
of the set of observations  S(I), where k =  1, 2,  . . ., s1 and where the 
forecast  is generated  by all of the observations,  save for the kth, of S(I). 
And think of R(II) as being the variance of the forecast of the kth 
observation of  S(I), where the forecast is generated by all of  the 
observations of the set S(II), save for the kth observation of S(I), a 
proper  subset of S(II). Then R(II)/R(I)  is a test statistic. The smaller  is 
that ratio, the greater  is the increase in forecast accuracy, and the less 
likely is it that there has been structural  change  or that  the sets S(I) and 
S(II) come from  different  economic processes. 
But determining  only how forecasts compare, or what value of 
R(II)/R(I)  turns up, is not entirely satisfactory. Even with structural 
change,  adding  observations  may  (presumably  as a very  small  probability 
event) increase forecast accuracy. Fortunately, the effect of adding 
observations can, so to say, be isolated by resort to samples of con- 
structed observations. Whatever the representation  of the economy 
being  used, it is estimated,  assuming  no structural  change,  from  S(I) and 
S(II), and  residuals  or errors  are calculated.  Then, by sampling  from  the 
errors,  new sets of observations  S1(I)  and  SI(II)  are  constructed,  and  the 
ratio  RI(II)/R  (I) is obtained.  Repeated  sampling  gives  Rj(II)/Rj(I),  where 
j  =  1, 2,  . . ., s,  and R(II)/R(I) is compared with them.  An R(II)/R(I) 
smaller  than the smallest of the Rj(II)lRj(I)  suggests structural  change. 
Why else would there be so little increase in forecast accuracy? In 
contrast,  an  R(II)/R(I)  larger  than  a reasonable  proportion  of the  Rj(II)lRj(I) 
suggests no structural  change. Unfortunately, the implication  of an 
R(II)/R(I)  larger  than  the largest  of the Rj(II)/Rj(I)  is at this moment  not 
entirely  clear, and  later  on I come back to that  difficulty. 
In implementing  the Litterman  procedure,  I used a thirteen-variable 
linear  autoregressive  representation  of the U.S. economy and  a method 
of estimation  of Doan, Litterman,  and Sims.  19  The periods  I used were, 
first,  January  1952-June  1966  and  July 1966-June  1970  and, second, July 
1970-March  1984  and  July 1966-June  1970. 
Percentage  improvements  in forecasts (decreases in variance)  that 
19. Doan, Litterman,  and  Sims, "Forecasting  and  Conditional  Projection." 420  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1984 
Table 1.  Results of a Test for Structural Change, January 1952-June  1966 
and July 1966-June  1970 
Percent 
Improvement  Measure  of 
Variablea  in  forecastb  significancec 
Real GNP  1.0  74.0 
Purchases  of consumer  durables  1.6  4.0 
Business  fixed investment  1.4  100.0 
Residential  construction  3.5  100.0 
Change  in business inventories  1.6  96.0 
Government  expenditures  0.8  38.0 
Government  receipts  2.5  94.0 
GNP deflator  0.0  20.0 
Three-month  Treasury  bill rate  - 2.1  76.0 
S&P 500 index  0.7  86.0 
Trade-weighted  value of U.S. dollar  0.1  44.0 
Money supply  (MI)  -0.2  46.0 
Total nonfinancial  debt  2.5  98.0 
a. The unit of time is the month. For the method  of interpolation,  see Thomas  Doan, Robert  Litterman,  and 
Christopher  Sims,  "Forecasting  and  Conditional  Projection  Using  Realistic  Prior  Distributions,"  Econometric Reviews 
(forthcoming). 
b. Using  actual  observations. 
c. The proportion  of fifty simulations  showing less improvement  in forecasting  than occurred  when actual 
observations  were  used. 
resulted  from  adding  the observations  of the period  July 1966-June  1970 
to those of the period January  1952-June  1966  are given for all of the 
thirteen  variables  in column one of table 1.20 In that column there is a 
zero entry for the GNP deflator;  and there are two entries perilously 
close to zero, that  for the trade-weighted  value of the dollar  and  that  for 
M1, the traditionally  defined  money  supply.  Of  the  remaining  ten entries, 
nine  are  positive. A conclusion  of no crucial  structural  change  is therefore 
reasonable. 
Percentage  improvements  in forecasts that resulted  from  adding  the 
observations  of the period July 1966-June 1970  to those of the period 
July 1970-March  1984  are given in column  one of table 2. Three of the 
entries are quite close to zero: those for the GNP deflator,  the three- 
month  Treasury  bill rate, and the increment  to total nonfinancial  debt. 
Seven of the remaining  ten entries are positive, and certainly that 
20. What  I report  are the values  of the {1  - [Rj(II)IRj(I)]}  100,  where  i is the index  over 
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Table 2.  Results of a Test for Structural Change, July 1970-March  1984 
and July 1966-June  1970a 
Percent 
Improvement  Measure  of 
Variablea  in  forecast  significance 
Real GNP  1.1  46.0 
Purchases  of consumer  durables  1.3  84.0 
Business fixed investment  2.9  100.0 
Residential  construction  1.6  100.0 
Change  in business inventories  1.0  70.0 
Government  expenditures  - 2.7  6.0 
Government  receipts  -4.4  6.0 
GNP deflator  0.2  18.0 
Three-month  Treasury  bill rate  0.2  44.0 
S&P 500 index  0.7  94.0 
Trade-weighted  value of U.S. dollar  -  1.3  42.0 
Money supply  (MI)  1.9  12.0 
Total nonfinancial  debt  -0.3  42.0 
a.  See  notes  to table  1. 
outcome is not strong evidence of structural  change even though we 
know that  there  was some.21 
The measure of significance  that I used is the percentage of fifty 
samples  of constructed  observations  that  produced  smaller  increases  in 
forecast accuracy  than did the actual  data. Those proportions  obtained 
from the periods January  1952-June  1966  and July 1966-June  1970  are 
given in column  two of table 1. Of the thirteen,  one is close to zero, that 
for purchases of consumer durables.  But that there are seven ranging 
from  20 percent  to 86 percent  is suggestive  of no structural  change. The 
problem is how to interpret  the remaining  five: the 100 percents for 
business fixed investment and residential  construction;  the 98 percent 
for total nonfinancial  debt; the 96 percent for the change in business 
inventories;  and if it is also judged as being too much like 100  percent, 
the 94 percent for government  receipts. If the availability  of credit at 
banks does matter greatly, it is perhaps a natural expectation that 
business fixed investment  and residential  construction,  as well as pur- 
21. It can  perhaps  be argued  that  since  interest  rate  restrictions  were  eliminated  during 
the period  July 1970-October  1983,  the evidence of no structural  change  casts doubt  on 
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chases of consumer  durables, should behave differently  when interest 
rate restrictions  are binding  and when they are not. In fact, though,  it is 
unclear how to interpret  a 100 percent value or actual observations 
producing  a larger  increase in forecasting  accuracy  than any sample  of 
constructed observations.22  What therefore seems reasonable is that 
column  two of table 1  conveys no strong  impression  of structural  change. 
Nor is such an impression conveyed by column two of table 2, in 
which the proportions  obtained  from  the periods  July 1970-March  1984 
and  July 1966-June  1970  appear.  Again,  we see 100  percent  for business 
fixed investment and for residential construction, and our suspicion 
about a change in economic structure  deepens a little. If 94 percent is 
taken as being different from 100 percent, though, then nine of the 
thirteen entries of column two of table 2 are consistent with no such 
change. 
It is thus not transparent  that the period  July 1966-June  1970,  during 
which banks were most tightly bound by interest rate restrictions, is 
special  in the relevant  way. Economic structure  may well have changed 
in, say, mid-1966.  That is now a little less likely than it was, though, 
except to those who were long ago persuaded  by the a priori  argument 
that  as intermediaries  banks  are convenient,  not necessary. A dispute  in 
economics differs from a courtroom  battle; economists do not have a 
generally  accepted rule  on where the burden  of proof  lies. Still, it would 
seem that  those who in effect argue  that  interest  rate  restrictions  are  the 
sine qua non of Federal  Reserve control  have an obligation  to come up 
with evidence. Something  more  than  historical  narrative  is required. 
REGULATORY  POLICY:  PERMISSIBLE  ACTIVITIES 
There is more to be said about restrictions  on interest  rates paid by 
banks. Even if the supply  of bank  credit  matters  little, such restrictions 
may make for a more effective Federal Reserve. I put off making  the 
argument,  however, until after having considered restrictions  on the 
22. Very  recently,  Litterman  told  me that  in  just-completed  experiments  he found  that 
the proportion  of the Rj(II)/Rj(I)  less than  R(II)/R(I)  can be sensitive  to what  the true 13  is 
assumed  to be. Estimating  with  a looser  prior  (in  the sense of Doan, Litterman,  and  Sims) 
he eliminated  each 100  percent  in column  one of tables 1 and  2. That  may seem like good 
news  to those  who  were skeptical  about  the  efficacy  of interest  rate  restrictions.  According 
to Litterman,  though,  we now have to wonder  a little  about  his test procedure. John H.  Kareken  423 
activities of banks and bank holding companies. In considering  these 
restrictions, I get into bank risk and the effectiveness of the Federal 
Reserve,  and  the  essence of the argument  about  interest  rate  restrictions, 
to be elaborated  later  on, is that  they may limit  the riskiness  of banks. 
Of late there have been many changes in the restrictions limiting 
banking  organizations  in their choices of activities. Two are, in a way, 
of special significance;  they justify counting S&Ls as banks, which is 
what I have been doing all along. The first took place in 1980 when 
Congress,  in passing  the Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  and  Mon- 
etary Control  Act, authorized  S&Ls all over the country  to offer NOW 
accounts. The second took place in 1982  when the Garn-St Germain 
Depository Institutions  Act was passed, and S&Ls were authorized  to 
make limited  amounts  of commercial  loans. But there have been other 
changes,  some  made  by  federal  and  some  made  by state  instrumentalities. 
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 empowered the Federal 
Reserve Board to determine, although with statutory guidance, the 
activities in which regulated  bank holding  companies  might  and might 
not engage. Over the years, it has made more and more activities 
permissible  and, as well, more  and  more  activities  impermissible.  Those 
activities  so far  determined  to be permissible  or impermissible  are  listed 
in appendix  B. Not that  a bare-bones  list of permissible  activities  is fully 
revealing;  an activity can be deemed permissible  but subject  to restric- 
tions. Still, using the appendix,  sufficiently  interested  readers  can form 
their  own rough  impressions  of how far the Federal  Reserve Board  has 
come in creating a potential for risky bank holding companies and, 
should  the fates of bank  and  nonbank  affiliates  be linked,  risky  commer- 
cial banks. 
My impression  is that  few of the activities  determined  by the Federal 
Reserve  Board  to be permissible,  whether  for all regulated  bank  holding 
companies or only for those that have applied to do specific things, 
involve  appreciable  risk.  To illustrate,  making  real  estate  appraisals  does 
not  involve such  risk, nor  does buying  and  selling  equities  for  customers' 
accounts. Among regulated  commercial  bank holding  companies, and 
commercial  banks as well, the search has in recent years been for fee- 
generating  activities requiring  by the conventional wisdom relatively 
small  amounts  of capital. And if a relatively small amount  of required 
capital  can rightly  be equated  with slight  risk, then the Federal  Reserve 
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Obviously,  running  an S&L  just rescued  from  failure  may  be a high-risk 
activity;  so may  dealing  in  precious  metals  or  writing  options.  But, again, 
the appearance  is not of a Federal Reserve Board having deliberately 
decided to let regulated commercial bank holding companies splash 
about  in treacherous  waters. 
In early spring  1984  the FDIC put out for comment  a regulation  that, 
if adopted,  will allow nonmember  (commercial)  banks  to underwrite  so- 
called  investment-quality  equities  and  bonds.  The  comment  period  ended 
at mid-year,  though, and the new regulation  is still to be adopted. We 
therefore  have to wonder  how serious  the FDIC  ever was, except about 
prodding  an indecisive Congress. Whatever  its inclination,  the FDIC 
has been hardly  more aggressive  than the Federal  Reserve Board. The 
same can be said of the Office of the Comptroller  of the Currency. 
Indeed, if contrasted  with state legislatures,  all three agencies appear 
more  as rabbits  than  lions. 
The handiworks  of three state legislatures  make the point. A while 
back, the California  legislature  adopted  an extremely  permissive  statute 
governing  investments  by state-chartered  S&Ls and, more  particularly, 
made it legal for those institutions  to have equity participations  in real 
estate developments.  In early 1983  the South  Dakota  legislature  author- 
ized out-of-state bank holding companies acquiring state-chartered 
commercial  banks  to use their  new affiliates  to sell insurance  nationwide. 
And finally  there  is the New York  legislature,  which  in mid-1984  passed 
an Omnibus  Banking  Act. By that act, state-chartered  banks  will soon 
be able to, among  other  things, own and  manage  existing  real  estate and 
real estate developments  and also make loans with equity kickers;  and 
some will be able, subject  to the prudent-man  rule, to hold equities  and 
fixed-income  claims  directly. 
It is  not,  however, to  be taken for granted that our bold state 
legislatures are leading the way to a bankers' paradise. The Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board has already altered very considerably the 
California  statute authorizing  equity participations  in real estate devel- 
opments  for state-chartered  S&Ls. With  the adoption  of the statute,  the 
Bank  Board  was inundated  with applications  for insurance  issued by the 
Federal  Savings  and Loan Insurance  Corporation  (FSLIC).  Alarmed  at 
the prospect of real estate developments  being financed  with federally 
guaranteed  loans, it first  delayed  in  processing  the applications  and  then, 
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insurance  that in effect undid much of what the California  legislature 
had  done. To be sure, the Bank Board  may be sued, the charge  being  in 
effect a lack of respect for state legislatures  and regulatory  agencies;23 
until  it has been, though,  and successfully, the California  legislature  will 
not have gotten  far. 
As of year-end 1983  three regulated  commercial  bank holding  com- 
panies-as  it happens,  three of the largest  of those with U.S. headquar- 
ters-had applied  to the  Federal  Reserve  Board  for  permission  to proceed 
with their acquisitions of state-chartered  South Dakota commercial 
banks and their plans for becoming nationwide  insurance  companies. 
After what looks to the outsider  as a farcical  delay in accepting  one of 
the applications,  the Federal Reserve Board tabled all three; that was 
early in 1984, and they are still gathering  dust. So what has the South 
Dakota  legislature  accomplished?  And what will the New York legisla- 
ture have accomplished?  That the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, 
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board will simply oblige the New 
York legislature  is certainly  not assured. The simple  truth  would seem 
to be that dual banking,  once a sleek and complacent  cow, has grown 
scraggy  and, with more  abuse, will grow  yet scraggier.  Evidently,  many 
members  of Congress, including  some of great  influence,  feel that they 
cannot be as indulgent  as many of their predecessors  were. It must be 
that, the threat  of oblivion  aside, we live in perilous  times. 
Thus, as I read the recent past, there has been no considerable 
weakening  of restrictions  on what  banking  organizations  may do. There 
could be in the future, but with Continental  Illinois National  Bank and 
Trust Company having gone bust, that has become, at least for the 
moment,  less likely. 
FROM  BEYOND  THE  PALE 
When  Congress  amended  the Bank  Holding  Company  Act in 1970,  it 
provided  a new definition  of the word  bank.  Thereafter,  any association 
23. In July 1984  the Federal  Home Loan Bank Board  issued a proposed  regulation 
that, if adopted,  will make  it tougher  than  at present  to become a manager  or director  of 
an S&L  insured  by the FSLIC. The regulation  is more  limiting  than  regulations  applying 
to state-chartered  S&Ls, and  state  regulators,  still  remembering  how  the  Bank  Board  dealt 
with those insurance applications  of state-chartered  California  S&Ls, are currently 
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that accepted demand  deposits and made commercial  loans was to be 
regarded  as a bank.24  And  still  today  any  association  that  accepts  demand 
deposits or makes commercial loans but does not do both is legally 
something  other  than  a bank.  It is a nonbank  bank  or, for me, a loophole 
bank. 
As has been so since 1956,  any  association  owning  a commercial  bank 
is, under  the Bank Holding  Company  Act, a commercial  bank holding 
company and, as such, subject to regulation  by the Federal Reserve 
Board. A company owning a loophole bank is not a commercial  bank 
holding  company, nor subject to regulation.  It is an unregulated  com- 
mercial  bank  holding  company. 
Who  in the private  sector first  came to appreciate  that  there  might  be 
opportunity  in the word  and being  different  from  or is not known. In the 
late 1970s, however, something  of a rush to establish loophole banks 
began. By the end of 1983  there  were, by the usual  way of counting,  fifty 
unregulated  commercial  bank holding companies in existence.25  And 
what a heterogeneous  fifty they were. To single out a few, there was a 
retail furniture  chain, a one-time specialist in the manufacture  of pens 
(since  gone out of banking),  and  an  industrial  conglomerate  of impressive 
proportions.  Also included  in the fifty were mutual  fund  managements, 
giant consumer  finance houses, and, last but hardly  least, some of the 
recently born financial-services  conglomerates.26  For me, however, 
because I consider S&Ls to be banks, there were not fifty unregulated 
bank  holding  companies  in  existence  at  year-end  1983  but  more,  including 
a manufacturer  of steel products and, even more interesting, a giant 
24. There  is a very  readable  discussion  of  the  change  in  definition  inJohnJ.  DiClemente, 
"The  Meeting  of Passion  and  Intellect:  A History  of the Term  'Bank'  in the Bank  Holding 
Company  Act," Staff Memorandum  83-1 (Federal  Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1983).  As 
DiClemente  points out (p. 7), it is explicitly stated  in the Garn-St  Germain  Depository 
Institutions  Act of 1982  that no S&L insured  by the FSLIC is to be considered  a bank. 
When, under  the 1982  act, S&Ls were given authority  to make  commercial  loans, there 
was perhaps  a danger  that regulation  of association  holding  companies  would  pass from 
the Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  to the Federal  Reserve. 
25. For an only very slightly  out-of-date  listing, see "Cross Industry  Ownership  of 
U.S. Commercial  Banks,"  American  Banker,  December  16, 1983,  pp. 30-3  1. 
26. See "The Perils  in Financial  Services," Business Week,  August  20, 1984,  pp. 52- 
57, for a brief  discussion  of how recent  entrants  into  banking  have  fared.  Not surprisingly, 
the main  theme  is how poorly  many  of those companies,  new also to insurance  and  stock 
brokering,  have done in the property  and  casualty  insurance  and  brokerage  businesses.  It 
is, however,  of some  relevance  that  accounting  profits  or cash  flows  of companies  in those 
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retailer  whose catalogue was long ago the Playboy  magazine  of farm 
boys. 
Under the law an owner of one S&L or, under  very special circum- 
stances, more  than  one is not subject  to regulation  by the Federal  Home 
Loan Bank Board. Few seem to mind, though; the fussing has been 
mostly about loophole banks and, by implication, their owners, the 
unregulated  commercial  bank  holding  companies.  The Federal  Reserve 
Board  has gone to extraordinary  lengths  to get those companies  into its 
fold. It evidently sees them as being, by their very existence, quite a 
serious problem. Yet it does not seem ever to have stressed that an 
increased  number  of loophole banks will in any direct way make open 
market  operations  less effective.27  For  one thing,  existing  loophole  banks 
have to hold required  reserves, and  barring  some strange  development, 
new loophole banks, if ever there are any, will too. Presumably  the 
Federal Reserve Board is worried that unregulated  commercial  bank 
holding  companies,  being  beyond  its reach,  can  be as risky  as they please 
and  therefore  threaten  the stability  of the banking  industry.  A mere  fifty 
unregulated  commercial  bank holding  companies, all owners of banks 
with piddling  footings, cannot  cause much  trouble.  But a legal loophole 
may be like a hole in a dike. 
THE  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE 
I come back  now to what  I described  as an interesting  possibility:  that 
the Federal Reserve is less effective than it was, not because it is any 
less able in whatever sense to control nominal  GNP, but because it is 
less likely to want  to; or if it has not already  become more  susceptible  to 
distraction,  that it will become so over the years immediately  ahead. 
27. In his "The Meeting  of Passion and Intellect," p. 34, DiClemente  suggests  that 
"any proposal  [to acquire  what will be a loophole  bank]  which has the effect of making 
monetary  control more difficult  is unlikely to be approved  absent compelling  public 
benefits."  He cites the Federal  Reserve's decision  on the application  of First  Bancorpo- 
ration  of Salt  Lake City  to acquire  Beehive Financial  Corporation  and  thereby  the latter's 
wholly owned industrial  bank subsidiary,  Beehive Thrift  and Loan Company,  both also 
located  in Salt Lake City [Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol. 68 (April  1982),  pp. 253-55]. In 
approving  the application,  the Federal  Reserve  made  Beehive  Thrift  subject  to Regulation 
D and  Regulation  Q. For nearly  all loophole  banks,  however,  there  has been no question 
of the applicability  of those regulations,  nor in the future  will there  be. Still, the Federal 
Reserve continues  to fuss about loophole banks and their unregulated  owners. It must 
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What  I had in mind  was that deregulation  can make  a banking  industry 
less  stable, that is,  riskier or more prone to crisis, at least when 
government-provided  deposit insurance  is improperly  priced, as it is in 
the United States. In considering  the changes made in restrictions  on 
the activities of banking organizations  doing business in the United 
States, I did not find the scope for risk taking  to have been increased 
appreciably.  That there may be more changes in the future cannot be 
ignored,  however, and again  there  is more  to be said about  interest  rate 
restrictions  having  been eliminated.  Moreover,  if the Federal  Reserve  is 
right  in its concern about  unregulated  commercial  bank  holding  compa- 
nies, then until Congress redefines  what a bank is and thereby puts a 
stop to the proliferation  of such companies, the banking  industry  must 
become ever riskier. 
It is generally  agreed that the Federal  Reserve has a responsibility, 
although  poorly  defined,  to deal  with  incipient  and  actual  financial  crises. 
But can having  to deal with  a financial  crisis, looming  or already  arrived, 
reasonably  be equated with having to let nominal  GNP change other 
than as the Federal Reserve would wish? On that there is bound to be 
dispute. Or  am I so sure of that  only because I am myself of two minds? 
One  bank  being  in trouble,  experiencing  what  is often  euphemistically 
referred  to as a liquidity  problem,  cannot be thought  of as distracting. 
The Federal  Reserve can lend to one bank,  or several, and, composition 
aside, keep its portfolio  of assets what  it otherwise  would  have been. An 
increase in borrowed reserves is offset by a decrease in unborrowed 
reserves. Or, coming  back to the Federal  Reserve's portfolio,  discount 
window  loans are substituted  for Treasury  securities,  as they were when 
Continental  Illinois  Bank  was foundering. 
With  a great  many  banks  near  the edge, however,  the Federal  Reserve 
could be required  or could be perceived as being required  to maintain 
more or less constant nominal interest rates. (Presumably  the banks 
would all have to be substantially  unhedged.)  Or  there might  be a great 
many  commercial  and  industrial  companies  near  the edge. But there  is a 
response: even if it has to keep nominal  interest rates unchanged,  the 
Federal  Reserve cannot be other than  faithful  to its responsibility  for a 
well-behaved nominal GNP; for when a true financial  upset or crisis 
occurs, the danger is deflation, and maintaining  unchanged nominal 
interest  rates is therefore  being responsible.  What  we come to, then, is 
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rates  unchanged  or, if possible, to push  them  lower  when inflation  is the 
real  or imagined  long-term  danger. 
In 1966  the Federal  Reserve was, in a manner  of speaking,  forced to 
a less restrictive  open market  policy by a threatened  collapse of S&Ls. 
Whether  it was confronted  by an incipient  financial  crisis is arguable; 
there  was no sudden  revelation  of large  loan losses. In 1970  the Federal 
Reserve  was forced  to change  policy again,  to once more  become easier 
than it would have wanted to be, by the failure  of Penn Central.  That 
failure  could, I believe, have resulted  in a classic financial  upset. Yet, as 
I remember,  the Federal  Reserve was only briefly  distracted;  in a matter 
of months its policy was much as it had been before the failure. Thus, 
recent history leaves us wondering.  The Federal  Reserve being forced 
off course for a sufficiently  long period of time may be at best only an 
abstract  possibility. 
It is tempting  to argue  from the Federal Reserve's traditional  stand 
on regulation  that it sees being torn  by its two responsibilities  as all too 
real a danger. If no less willing than the FDIC or the Office of the 
Comptroller  of the Currency  to, for example, authorize  new activities 
for commercial banks, it is fanatical about having responsibility  for 
regulation.  Consider  how Chairman  Volcker successfully resisted the 
reorganization  of bank  regulation  intended  by the Task Force on Regu- 
lation  of Financial  Services.28  We do not, however, have to think  of the 
Federal  Reserve as being power mad. Another  explanation  for its rigid 
insistence on being a regulator is  an appreciation  that how tightly 
commercial  banks  and  parent  holding  companies  are  regulated  influences 
the probability  of a financial  upset and thereby the probability  of its 
having,  perhaps  at  a crucial  moment,  to disregard  cumulating  inflationary 
pressures.  Of  course, to get  from  that  appreciation  to the  Federal  Reserve 
as regulator,  it is necessary to assume that the FDIC and the Office of 
the Comptroller  of the Currency,  oriented  differently  from the Federal 
Reserve, cannot  be expected or trusted  to regulate  with the objective  of 
keeping  the Federal  Reserve  from  having  to serve  as lender  of last resort. 
28. For an interpretation  of what must have been quite a battle, see  "Volcker 
Apparently  Blocks  Effort  to Cut  Fed Authority  Over  Banks,"  Wall  Street  Journal,  January 
26, 1984,  p. 31. See also "New Banking  Agency Would  Be Formed  Under  Proposal  to 
Streamline  Regulation," Wall Street Journal, February 1, 1984, p. 6. For a general 
discussion  of the problem  of organization,  see Andrew  S. Carron,  "Banking  on Change: 
The  Reorganization  of Financial  Regulation,"  The  Brookings  Review,  vol. 3 (Spring  1984), 
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What the Federal Reserve believes is not, however, simply to be 
accepted  as gospel, and I am left not knowing  what  to conclude. Again, 
can there be real conflict between what most regard as the Federal 
Reserve's responsibility  to maintain  an unchanging  average of dollar 
prices and, as required,  to serve as lender of last resort?  The answer 
may well be no. But an increased  rate of inflation  is not the only cost of 
a financial  crisis. I therefore go on now to consider how even such 
deregulation  as we have had  may make  for a riskier  banking  industry. 
EXCESSIVE  COMPETITION 
As has been noted, it was widely accepted in the 1930s that the 
financial  crisis of 1930-33 was caused in large part by an excess of 
commercial  bank  competition.  Before  the crisis, some  banks,  competing 
for deposits, pushed offering  rates ever higher  and, to offset each cost 
increase, acquired  still more  risky  loans. Then  they were caught  out. Or 
so the explanation  goes. Economists  have generally  been skeptical.  But 
with no restrictions  on rates paid by banks and with deposit insurance 
provided  by government  but paid for with premiums  not dependent  on 
bank risk, an increasingly  risky banking  industry  is much more than a 
possibility. 
That  phrase  excessive  competition is not a happy  one. What  is to be 
argued  can be put better: the bank that is most inclined  to risk default 
forces all the others in its market  to follow its lead. Imagine  a bank  that, 
for whatever  reason, wants to plunge. With  no effective restrictions  on 
rates  paid to bank  depositors,  it increases  its offering  rates  and, as must 
be assumed, its deposits; and it acquires relatively high-risk  assets 
seeming to promise extraordinary  returns.  But what does a rival bank 
do, faced with such an aggressive  bank?  Watch  as its deposits  decrease? 
Or  follow the aggressive  bank?  Watching  or sitting  idly by can easily be 
equated, rightly  or wrongly, with going out of business. The rival  bank 
is much more likely to follow. Until interrupted  by a bad draw, some 
banks  can thus make  all others more  and  more  default  prone, but  only if 
bank liabilities are insured  by government  and premiums  do not vary 
with default risk. There is precious little solace in that qualification, 
though,  since neither  the FDIC  nor  the Federal  Home Loan  Bank  Board 
nor  the Federal  Reserve has yet come to risk-dependent  premiums.  The 
elimination  of restrictions  on rates paid  by banks  is not to be viewed as 
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For some months, proponents  of deregulation  have been saying  that 
the failure  of Continental  Illinois Bank  is not to be attributed  to deregu- 
lation. In a sense, that is right;  large losses in activities only recently 
made  permissible  are not what  caused it to fail. It failed  because it made 
too many loans that, in the event, were bad. What  some proponents  of 
deregulation  have perhaps  forgotten,  though, is that the elimination  of 
restrictions  on rates  paid  to bank  creditors  qualifies  as deregulation.  The 
failure  of Continental  Illinois  can therefore  be attributed  to deregulation, 
although  not of recent years. It was in 1970  that restrictions  applying  to 
rates  paid on large  certificates  of deposit were eliminated;  but the bank 
could not have followed the course it did if those restrictions had 
continued  to be, at least on occasion, binding. 
What the Future Holds 
With  Penn  Square  Bank  having  failed  only a couple  of years  ago, with 
the only thinly  disguised  failure  of Continental  Illinois  Bank  even clearer 
in memory, and with international  loans worth but fractions of their 
original  (expected) present values so prominent  in the portfolios  of the 
largest U.S. banks, it is perhaps  too easy to see the future  as bleak. I 
believe, though, that it is bleak and most likely will remain  so. Unless 
deposit  insurance  policy is changed  appropriately,  the financial  upset of 
the present could well be the first  (and  least depressing)  of many. I also 
believe that we cannot  count on deposit  insurance  policy being  changed 
for the better anytime soon. The desirable  alternative  is, I believe, to 
make  supervision  of banks  more  effective. 
GOVERNMENT  INSURANCE  TERMS 
Today there is much greater awareness that government-provided 
deposit insurance can mean trouble if premiums  are the same for all 
insured  banks. Officials of the FDIC have long been particularly  im- 
pressed  with  the danger  inherent  in improperly  priced  deposit  insurance; 
one can go back a way and find them arguing  that as deregulation 
proceeds, banks will become freer and freer to take advantage of 
government  deposit  insurance  and  that  banks  therefore  have to be made 
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change deposit insurance  policy on its own. When Penn Square  Bank 
failed,  the FDIC  did  not  do the expected;  instead  of merging  Penn  Square 
into an ongoing bank, it paid off depositors, but of course none more 
than the statutory  insurance  maximum,  $100,000.  So more than a few 
suffered (or in the end will suffer) losses. Thus did the FDIC make a 
point of extreme significance:  being  fully insured  was not to be taken  as 
a fact of life. If not in so many  words, the FDIC  has denied  that  its intent 
in paying off was to make that point, but in the interval  between the 
failure  of Penn Square  and the failure  of Continental  Illinois it paid off 
the creditors of quite a few failed banks, admittedly  all small, some of 
which could, however, have been merged. 
With  the failure  of Continental  Illinois Bank, the FDIC's attempt  to 
end full insurance  coverage for all bank  depositors  and thereby  subject 
banks  to market  discipline  came to an abrupt  end. Since announcing  that 
no creditor  of Continental  Illinois or of its parent  would lose so much 
as a dime, it has been soundly criticized for treating  large and small 
commercial  banks  differently,  and almost  certainly  much  time will pass 
before it starts  in again  where it left off when Continental  Illinois  came 
crashing  down on it. 
One wonders whether  the FDIC should ever have begun  its attempt 
to make  effective the statutory  insurance  maximum.  After  all, funds  can 
be parceled  out among  different  banks  at slight  cost. Switching  to a large 
bank,  one so large  that  in the event of failure  its creditors  could  not, as a 
practical  matter,  be paid  off, is another  possibility.  And  what  if somehow 
a statutory  maximum  could be made  effective?  The threat  of a bank  run 
would  become  real  again;  banks  could  once again  be likened  to dominoes. 
There is the possibility that Congress  will decree risk-dependent  insur- 
ance premiums  and perhaps  even spell out how the risk components  of 
premiums  are to be determined.  But until the experts have reached a 
consensus on how deposit insurance  should  be priced, Congress  is not, 
I believe, going  to do anything  of the sort. Nor are the insuring  agencies 
going to introduce  risk-dependent  premiums  on their  own. (For what it 
is worth,  the FDIC  and  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  could,  however, 
both soon begin  charging  penalty  premiums  for "poor  management.") 
Of all the possible changes  in deposit  insurance  policy, one stands  out 
as practical  and at least vaguely sensible: the insuring  agencies might 
require  every insured  bank  to have subordinated  debt. It is not clear to 
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insurance  contract, for the optimal  contract  has so far eluded me. The 
practicality  of the change  in policy is what  makes  it appealing.  Required 
subordinated  debt would, I suspect, have to be short term, but banks 
could be allowed to consider their outstanding  subordinated  claims as 
capital. Were they to be so allowed, a subordinated  debt requirement 
might  be more  acceptable  than  it otherwise  would  be, for the regulatory 
agencies, having recently gotten statutory  authority,  are engaged  now 
in imposing capital-to-asset  ratios greater than those that heretofore 
were acceptable. 
Hopeful  of being wrong, I recall  my conjecture:  over the foreseeable 
future,  deposit  insurance  policy  is going  to remain  essentially  unchanged. 
We must  keep in mind  that  the FDIC  emerged  from  the crisis  of the early 
1930s to guarantee the survival of thousands of small independent 
commercial  banks. Now, once again, many such banks face doubtful 
futures, and that Congress  will do anything  it believes might  make  their 
demise even more  likely seems most doubtful.  Furthermore,  most if not 
all S&Ls are quite content with the insurance  policy of the present. For 
S&Ls, full insurance coverage for all except possibly subordinated 
creditors  is still a happy  fact of life. The  future  could  be filled,  then, with 
more or less  blatant attempts to  exploit the federal government's 
insurance  guarantee.  That  recent episode with the state-chartered  Cali- 
fornia S&Ls, referred  to earlier, may indicate what lies ahead. It may 
also indicate  how reregulation  is going to be managed:  whenever  a new 
way of exploiting  the government's  guarantee  comes to the attention  of 
the officials of one or the other of our insuring  agencies, new ad hoc 
restrictions  will be imposed. The prospect  is certainly  not pleasing,  for 
although  the smothering  of profit-inspired  creativity  may be necessary, 
what the future would seem to demand more than anything else is 
improved  bank supervision. 
I should  like to know how Penn Square  Bank  and  Continental  Illinois 
Bank and also Empire Savings and Loan Association of Mesquite, 
Texas, could have got to where they did. There  may be others who are 
puzzled  too. A bank,  even after  having  launched  itself on a risky  course, 
can have a run of good luck. And it may not be easy for an examiner  to 
blow  the whistle if, despite the obvious  riskiness  of the course, the bank 
seems  to be paying  off handsomely.  It may  also not  be easy for  a $30,000- 
a-year bank examiner to  deal with a bank's $300,000-a-year  chief 
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except in certain  rare  circumstances,  regulatory  officials  are extremely 
reluctant  to use their  enforcement  powers. 
As I indicated, I am puzzled. Yet, believing that deposit insurance 
policy is not going to be changed  appropriately  and that restrictions  on 
rates paid bank creditors are not going to be reimposed, I see more 
effective official policing of bank loan portfolios as essential for the 
future.  It is not that  bank  examiners  are  superior  to bankers  in appraising 
risks. Indeed not. How many examiners are on record as knowing 
beforehand  that  a decrease  in the price  of oil was in the offing?  The point 
is that an examiner  is more likely than the profit-maximizing  banker  to 
insist on, say, loan diversification. 
Referring  to bank  examiners,  I perhaps  reveal  myself as being  terribly 
old fashioned. With  new communication  and record-keeping  technolo- 
gies, it is most unlikely that individuals  are still required  to monitor 
banks.  That  is the wonder. How could  the failed  banks  of the recent  past 
get to where they did? The new technologies do, nonetheless,  justify a 
certain  hope for the future. 
Conclusion 
U.S.  bank regulatory  policy has changed but not so drastically  or 
fundamentally  as to make the Federal  Reserve incapable  of influencing 
nominal  GNP. If effective  is defined using a reduced-form  multiplier, 
then the Federal  Reserve is not less effective than  it was, even though 
restrictions  on nominal  interest  rates  paid  by banks  have  been  eliminated. 
So far as I am concerned  it is still open whether,  as a result  of deregula- 
tion, the effect on nominal  GNP of a change in the Federal Reserve's 
portfolio of Treasury securities is noisier than it was. If permanently 
noisier,  then, on any sensible  definition  of the word,  the Federal  Reserve 
is less effective than it was. But I did not confront  the possibility of a 
noisier  effect directly. 
Nor, on any sensible definition,  is deregulation  in the years immedi- 
ately ahead likely to make the Federal Reserve much, if any, less 
effective. Most of the deregulation  to which we can reasonably  look 
forward  (for  instance, a weakening  or elimination  of geographic  restric- 
tions) is irrelevant  to the Federal  Reserve's ability  to influence  nominal 
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But one caveat must be recorded. With some small to very small 
probability,  banks  will one day be allowed  to underwrite  insurance  and 
equities  and bonds; and underwriting,  whether  of insurance  or equities 
and bonds, is a relatively risky bank activity. Above, I suggested  that 
when  serving  as lender  of last  resort  the Federal  Reserve  may  on occasion 
find  itself having  to accept more  inflation  than  it otherwise  would. There 
may well be nothing in that; I am myself quite unsure whether more 
inflation  than desired  could ever result  from the Federal  Reserve being 
distracted  by a financial  crisis, incipient  or actual. Yet, even if not, no 
financial crisis is  costless.  And I  rather suspect that until deposit 
insurance  policy is changed, we will pay for having first deregulated, 
even though  only a little, by bearing  the costs of recurring  crises. To put 
the point another  way, those who are interested  in the consequences  of 
deregulation  should look to how the riskiness of the banking  industry 
has been affected. 
APPENDIX  A 
Litterman's  Test  for Structural  Change29 
CONSIDER  the vector autoregressive  representation  X(t) =  3X(t  -  1) + 
u(t), where  var u(t)  =  E. There are observations  X(t) for the discrete 
points in time t1, . . . , tm,  tn,  .  .  . , tT.  Let I,  XI be the structure generating 
the observations  for t1,.  .  . , tm  or, equivalently,  the observations of the 
regime I period; and let  Y,  , be the structure generating the observa- 
tions for tn, .  .  .  , tT,  the observations,  that is, of the regime II period. 
The question  is whether  the economic structures  of the regime  I and 
regime II periods are essentially alike. Is the condition PI =  1I,, with 
$1  =  XII,  approximately  satisfied? Litterman  has proposed a way of 
deciding  that. 
Suppose  that  the task is to forecast  the out-of-sample  observation  for 
th,  where h =  1, 2,  . ..  , m. One can do that using the above autoregres- 
sive representation estimated from all the observations  for tl,  . . . , tm 
except  that  for th;  or, alternatively,  one can use the same  representation, 
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but estimated from all of the observations for tl,  .  .  .  , tT  other than that 
for th.  As  Litterman has noted, with economic structures that are 
essentially  alike, the second forecast  should  be, in some accepted  sense, 
better  than  the first. 
Litterman's  reasoning  suggests  the following  procedure.  For any t of 
the set t1, . . .,  tmi say th, the autoregressive representation is estimated 
using all of the observations  for the regime  I period other than that for 
th.  Then, with the representation  as estimated,  a forecast of the obser- 
vation for  th  is made,  where  h  =  1, 2,  .  . . , m. With all m forecasts 
having  been made,  the root  mean  squared  errors  (RMSEs)  for  the several 
components of X are calculated. The RMSE for the ith component  is 
Ri(I), where the I in parentheses is a reminder  that the forecast was 
based on an estimation  using  only observations  for the regime  I period. 
The second step in the Litterman  procedure  involves, first,  estimating 
the autoregressive  representation  using  the observations  of the regime  I 
period, except that for th,  and those of the regime II period. Then a 
forecast  of the observation  for th is made, h =  1, 2,  .  . . , m, and the 
RMSEs  for all of the components  of Xare calculated.  The RMSE  for the 
ith component  of X is Rj(II),  where the II in parentheses  is a reminder 
that the forecast was based on an estimation  using the observations  of 
the regime II period as well as those of the regime I period, with the 
exception of that  for th. 
A comparison  of Ri(I)  and  Rj(II)  bears  on how alike  are the economic 
structures  of the regime  I and regime  II periods. There  is, for example, 
the extreme outcome  Ri(I) > Rj(II)  for all i. It is a weak confirmation  of 
the null hypothesis that the economic structures  of the two periods  are 
alike. 
The numbers  in the first column of tables 1 and 2 of the text are the 
values  of the {1 -  [Ri(II)/Ri(I)]}100  for  the thirteen  variables  of the vector 
autoregressive  representation  that  was used  to test for structural  change. 
Thus, zero is the critical value. A first-column  entry greater  than zero 
indicates  that using  the observations  of the regime  II period  makes  for a 
better forecast and hence, as was suggested immediately above, is 
consistent with no change  in structure.  In contrast,  a first-column  entry 
less than zero indicates that using the regime II period observations 
makes  for a worse forecast and so hints  at a change  in structure. 
That the extreme outcome Ri(I) >  Rj(II)  for all i was referred  to as 
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change, an increase in sample size can result in an improved  forecast. 
Litterman  has proposed  dealing  with the difficulty  of rival  explanations 
for better  forecasts by resort to Monte Carlo simulations.  The autore- 
gressive structure is  estimated using all of the observations. Then 
assuming  that errors  are normally  distributed,  but with E1 = 11 and  2 
=  111, where 1 and 2 denote the regime I and regime II periods, new 
observations  are constructed  for a sample of errors, and RMSEs are 
obtained  in precisely the way previously  described.  Let R?(I) and  R9(II) 
be the simulation  analogues  of, respectively,  Ri(I)  and  Ri(II).  A second 
subscript  can be introduced,  though, to serve as an index of samples. 
Thus, for all i, repeated sampling  from the assumed distributions  of 
errors  generates  the sets R?(I)  and  R9J(II),  j  =  1, 2, .  .  .,  s. 
The ratio REJ(II)/R?J(I)  is a measure of the improvement in forecasting 
resulting  from an increase in sample size. And comparing  the ratios 
Rj(II)/Rj(I) and R?J(II)/R?J(I)  for all i and j amounts  to testing  the null 
hypothesis.  (Recall  that the R?(I)  and R?J(II) were  calculated  on  the 
assumption 1  =  fI  or, in other  words, from  observations  generated  by 
the autoregressive  representation  estimated using all actual observa- 
tions.)  Certainly Rj(I)/Rj(II) >  R?J(I)/R?J(II)  for all i and j is inconsistent 
with the null hypothesis.  But Rj(I)/Rj(II) < R?(I)/R?(II)  for some i andj 
may be consistent. 
Another and, according to Litterman, better way of isolating the 
effect of increased  sample  size is by randomly  choosing  from  the actual 
errors of the regime I and regime II periods. As he has observed, so 
choosing "generates a distribution  [of changes in forecast variances] 
that is robust with respect to deviations from the normality  assump- 
tion.  "30  And indeed, in the Monte Carlo  simulations  actually  done, the 
sampling  was from  actual  errors. 
Repeated  samples  generate  sets of RMSEs,  denoted  R  (I)  and  R  (II), 
j = 1, 2, .  , s. And the numbers  in the second columns  of tables 1 and 
2 of the text summarize  how the ratios Rj(I)/Rj(II)  and Ri*(I)IRi*(II) 
compare. In the experiment that was done, s  =  50, and any second 
column  entry  is, for the appropriate  value  of i, the proportion  of the fifty 
simulations  satisfying  Rj(I)/Rj(II) <  R?(I)/R?(II).  A middling value  (a 
0.4, for example, or even a 0.9) is consistent with no structural  change. 
But a zero must  give pause; it suggests structural  change.  The improve- 
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ment  in forecast obtained  by adding  actual  observations  is less than  the 
minimum  of the improvements  obtained  by adding  constructed  obser- 
vations. 
The other extreme value, unity, is perplexing. It need not suggest 
structural  change; a value of unity can result if the true economic 
structure  is nonlinear.  There  is, however, another  possible explanation 
for unity showing  up, an explanation  consistent with structural  change 
although  only of a particular  sort. Take structural  change to be a fact. 
The actual  observations  of the regime  II period  may be such that, when 
combined with the actual observations of the regime I period, they 
produce  a better  estimate  of the true  i  of the regime  I period  than  do the 
actual  observations  of the regime  I period. Should  they do so, the result 
is a relatively  large  improvement  in forecast. 
APPENDIX  B 
Permissible  and Impermissible  Activities 
for Commercial  Bank Holding Companies3l 
Activities Permitted as "Closely Related to Banking"32 
BY REGULATION 
1. Making  or acquiring  loans or other extensions of credit for own 
account or account of others, such as would be made by mortgage, 
finance, credit card, or factoring  companies [(b)(1);  57 FRB 512 (June 
1971)].33 
2.  Operating  as an industrial  bank  or industrial  loan company  [(b)(2); 
57 FRB 513 (June 1971)]. 
31. Through  March  1984.  Adapted  from  Golembe  Associates,  Bank  Expansion  Quar- 
terly,  vol. 34 (First  Quarter  1984),  pp. 40-45. 
32. See section  4(c)(8)  of the  Bank  Holding  Company  Act, in  which  the  phrase  appears; 
or see the excellent introduction  to U.S. bank  regulatory  policy, Carter  H. Golembe  and 
David S. Holland, Federal Regulation  of Banking 1983-84 (Washington, D.C.:  Golembe 
Associates, 1983),  pp. 146-47. 
33. Citations  to (b)(1),  (b)(2),  and so on refer  to subsections  of Regulation  Y section 
225.25,  which  is the revision  that  became  effective February  6, 1983.  Citations  such  as 57 
FRB 512 (June 1971)  indicate  the volume  number,  page number,  month,  and year of the 
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3. Servicing  loans or other extensions of credit [(b)(1);  57 FRB 513 
(June  1971)]. 
4.  Conducting  trust or fiduciary  activities [(b)(3);  57 FRB 513 (June 
1971);  60 FRB 447 (June  1974)]. 
5. Acting  as investment  or  financial  adviser  to the  extent  of (1)  serving 
as advisory company  to a mortgage  or real estate investment  trust, (2) 
serving as investment adviser to mutual  funds, (3) providing  portfolio 
investment advice to other persons, (4) furnishing  general economic 
information,  general  statistical  forecasting,  and  industry  studies, and  (5) 
providing  financial  advice to state and local governments  on matters 
such as issuing securities and financing  real estate projects [(b)(4);  57 
FRB 513 (June 1971);  58 FRB 149 (February  1972);  58 FRB 571 (June 
1972);  59 FRB 701 (September 1973);  66 FRB 984 (December 1980); 
Board  of  Governors  v.  Investment  Company  Institute,  450  U.S.  46 
(1981)] 
6.  Leasing  personal  and  real  property  provided  the transaction  is the 
functional  equivalent  of an extension of credit, i.e., a full payout lease 
[(b)(5);  57 FRB 513 (June 1971);  57 FRB 725 (September  1971);  62 FRB 
930 (November 1976)]. 
7.  Making  equity or debt investments in corporations  designed to 
promote community  welfare or rehabilitation  [(b)(6);  57 FRB 513, 515 
(June 1971);  58 FRB 572, 595 (June 1972);  62 FRB 639 (July 1976);  64 
FRB 45 (January  1978);  Federal Reserve Board staff letter BHC-180 
(June  25, 1979)]. 
8. Providing  data processing and data transmission  services, data 
bases, or facilities (including  data processing and data transmission 
hardware,  software,  documentation,  and  operating  personnel),  or  access 
to such services, data  bases, or facilities  by any technologically  feasible 
means, where the data to  be processed are financial, banking, or 
economic [(b)(7)  and S225.123(e);  57 FRB 513, 515 (June  1971);  61 FRB 
245 (April 1975);  68 FRB 505 (August 1982);  68 FRB 552 (September 
1982)]. 
9. Acting as agent for sale of insurance (including  property and 
casualty  insurance)  directly  related  to certain  extensions  of credit  or the 
provision  of other  financial  services by a bank  or bank-related  firm;  and 
acting  as agent for sale of any insurance  in communities  not exceeding 
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bank holding  company is located in a community  having  a population 
not exceeding 5,000 [(b)(8); 57 FRB 674 (August 1971);  58 FRB 800 
(September  1972);  Alabama  Association of Insurance  Agents v. Board 
of Governors,  533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 976), rehearing  denied, 558 F.2d 
729, cert. denied, 35 U.S. 904; 65 FRB 924 (November 1979);  66 FRB 
987  (December  1980);  67 FRB 629  (August  1981);  S601  of the Depository 
Institution  Act of 1982  (Public  Law 97-320)]. 
10. Underwriting  credit  life and  credit  accident  and  health  insurance 
directly  related  to credit  extensions  by the  bank  holding  company  system 
[(b)(9);  59 FRB 20 (January  1973);  62 FRB 537 (June 1976);  S601 of the 
Depository Institutions  Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-320);  69 FRB 815 
(October  1983)]. 
11. Operating  courier services for time-critical  bank or financially 
related  instruments,  documents,  records,  and  processing  media  [(b)(10); 
59 FRB 892  (December  1973);  National Courier  Association v. Board  of 
Governors, 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975);  61 FRB 588 (September 
1975)]. 
12. Providing  management  consulting  advice to nonaffiliated  banks 
and nonbank  depository  institutions  [(b)(1  1);  60 FRB 223 (March  1974); 
60 FRB 446, 470 (June  1974);  68 FRB 237, 248 (April  1982);  69 FRB 926 
(December  1983)]. 
13. Issuance  and  sale oftravelers  checks [(b)(12);  65 FRB  250  (March 
1979);  67 FRB 912 (December  1981)]. 
14. Issuance  and sale at retail  of money  orders  and  similar  consumer- 
type payment instruments  ($1,000 maximum  face value), and sale of 
U.S. savings bonds [(b)(12);  63 FRB 414, 416 (April 1977);  65 FRB 250 
(March  1979);  67 FRB 912 (December  1981)]. 
15. Performing  real estate appraisals  [(b)(13);  66 FRB 975, 984 (De- 
cember 1980)]. 
16. Arranging  equity financing, which involves arranging  for the 
financing of  commercial or industrial income-producing  real estate 
through  the transfer  of the title, control, and  risk  of the project  from  the 
owner/developer  to one or more  investors  [(b)(14);  68 FRB 647  (October 
1982);  69 FRB 34 (January  1983);  69 FRB 225  (March  1983);  69 FRB 646, 
651 (August 1983)]. 
17. Conducting  securities brokerage  and margin  lending activities 
[(b)(15);  69 FRB 105  (February  1983);  69 FRB 718 (September  1983)]. 
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general  obligations  of states and their  political subdivisions,  and other 
obligations  eligible  for that  purpose  to member  banks, including  certain 
money  market  instruments  such as bankers  acceptances  and  certificates 
of deposit [(b)(16);  62 FRB 928 (November 1976);  64 FRB 222, 223 
(March  1978);  65 FRB 363  (April  1979);  68 FRB 249  (April  1982);  69 FRB 
465 (June  1983)]. 
19. Providing  advice concerning  foreign  exchange operations,  poli- 
cies, and  procedures  and  arranging  for  the execution  of foreign  exchange 
transactions  [(b)(17);  69 FRB 221 (March  1983)]. 
20. Acting as futures commission merchant  for futures contracts 
covering  bullion, foreign  exchange, U.S. government  securities, nego- 
tiable  U.S. money market  instruments,  and  certain  other  money market 
instruments (futures commission merchant activities also cover the 
provision of options on certain  futures contracts)  [(b)(18);  63 FRB 951 
(October  1977);  68 FRB 514 (August 1982);  68 FRB 651 (October  1982); 
68 FRB 776 (December 1982);  69 FRB 216, 220 (March  1983);  69 FRB 
733  (September  1983);  69  FRB 871  (November  1983);  70  FRB  53  (January 
1984)]. 
BY  ORDER 
1. Operating  a "pool-reserve  plan" for the pooling of loss reserves 
of banks with respect to their loans to small business [57 FRB 1037 
(December  1971)]. 
2.  Operating  a savings and loan type business in Rhode Island [58 
FRB 313 (March 1972);  58 FRB 417 (April 1972);  66 FRB 665 (August 
1980);  see also entry 11  below]. 
3.  Operating  a guaranty  (stock) savings  bank  in New Hampshire  [61 
FRB 901 (December 1975);  66 FRB 590, 594 (July 1980);  66 FRB 917 
(November  1980)]. 
4.  Buying and selling gold and silver bullion  and silver coin; dealing 
in exchange and silver futures and arbitraging  gold and silver interna- 
tionally  [September  27, 1973,  order  re Standard  and  Chartered  Banking 
Group,  Ltd., 38 Fed. Reg. 27552, October  4, 1973;  67 FRB 635 (August 
1981)]. 
5. Operating  an Article 12  New York  Investment  Company  [63 FRB 
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6. Providing consumer-oriented financial management courses, 
counseling,  and  related  financial  materials  [65  FRB 265 (March  1979)]. 
7.  Providing  check authorization,  verification,  or guarantee  services 
for  subscribing  merchants  [65  FRB  263  (March  1979);  66  FRB  64 (January 
1980);  67 FRB 740 (September  1981)]. 
8. Executing unsolicited  purchases and sales of securities as agent 
solely on the order  and  for  the account  of customers  [67  FRB  635  (August 
1981)]. 
9.  Performing  commercial  banking  functions at offshore locations; 
such  functions  include  funding  domestic  operations  through  the offshore 
wholesale money market  [68 FRB 251 (April  1982);  69 FRB 36 (January 
1983)]. 
10. Offering  NOW accounts, provided  they are subject  to the same 
federal  interest  rate  limitations  and  reserve  requirements  that  apply  to a 
federally insured depository institution  [68 FRB 253 (April 1982);  but 
see First Bancorporation  v. Board of Governors, 728 F.2d 434 (1Oth  Cir. 
1984)]. 
11. Operating  a savings  and  loan association,  provided  the powers of 
the S&L are no broader  than  the powers of bank  holding  companies  and 
the S&L acquired  is threatened  with financial  harm  [68 FRB 316 (May 
1982);  68 FRB 382 (June 1982);  68 FRB 656 (October  1982);  69 FRB 554 
(July 1983);  69 FRB 812 (October 1983);  70 FRB 149, 157 (February 
1984);  70 FRB 593 (July 1984)]. 
12. Providing  futures advisory services to both futures commission 
merchant  (FCM)  customers  and  non-FCM  customers  [70  FRB  369  (April 
1984)]. 
13. Issuance and sale of variably  denominated  payment  instruments 
with a maximum  face value of $10,000  [70  FRB 364 (April  1984)]. 
14. Brokering  options  on securities  issued or guaranteed  by the U.S. 
government  and  its agencies  and  on money  market  instruments;  broker- 
ing options in foreign currency  on exchanges regulated  by the SEC [70 
FRB 53 (January  1984);  70 FRB 368 (April  1984)]. 
15. Operating  a chartered bank that does not both take demand 
deposits and make commercial  loans [69 FRB 556 (July 1983);  69 FRB 
923 (December  1983);  70 FRB 371 (April  1984)]. 
16. Executing and clearing  options on bullion  and foreign  exchange 
on commodity  exchanges  regulated  by the Commodity  Futures  Trading 
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Activities Prohibited as "Not Closely Related to Banking" or 
"Not a Proper Incident Thereto"34 
1. Insurance  premium  (equity)  funding-that is, the combined sale 
of mutual  funds and  insurance  [58  FRB 905 (October  1972)]. 
2.  Underwriting  life insurance  that is not sold in connection with a 
credit  transaction  by a bank  holding  company  or a subsidiary  thereof  [58 
FRB 905 (October  1972)]. 
3. Real estate brokerage [58 FRB 427 (April 1972); 58 FRB 905 
(October  1972)]. 
4.  Land investment or development [58 FRB 428 (April 1972);  58 
FRB 905 (October  1972);  61 FRB 325 (May 1975)]. 
5. Real estate syndication [58 FRB 905 (October 1972); Federal 
Reserve Board  letter  re BankAmerica  Corp.  (April  4, 1972)]. 
6.  Management  consulting  [58  FRB 674, 676 (July  1972);  58 FRB 905 
(October  1972)]. 
7.  Property  management  services generally  [FRB  652 (July  1972);  58 
FRB 905 (October  1972);  64 FRB 415 (May 1978)]. 
8.  Underwriting  mortgage  guaranty  insurance  [60  FRB 681 (Septem- 
ber 1974);  60 FRB 727 (October  1974)]. 
9.  Operation  of a travel agency [62 FRB 148  (February  1976);  Asso- 
ciation of Bank Travel Bureaus v. Board of Governors, 568  F.2d 549  (7th 
Cir. 1978)]. 
10. Operation  of a savings and loan association  [63 FRB 280 (March 
1977); Federal Reserve Board letter re National Detroit Corpora- 
tion/Landmark  Savings & Loan (March 16, 1981);  68 FRB 316 (May 
1982);  68 FRB 382 (June 1982);  68 FRB 656 (October  1982);  70 FRB 593 
(July  1984)]. 
11. Underwriting  home loan life mortgage  insurance [66 FRB 660 
(August  1980)]. 
12. Contract  key entry services [66  FRB 666 (August  1980)]. 
13. Underwriting  property and casualty insurance and adjusting 
claims  and making  appraisals  relative  thereto [64 FRB 506 (June 1978); 
NCNB Corp. v. Board of Governors, 599 F.2d 609 (4th  Cir. 1979)]. 
14. Dealing  in platinum  and palladium  and other commodities  [Sep- 
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tember  27, 1973,  order  re Standard  and  Chartered  Banking  Group,  Ltd., 
38 Fed. Reg. 27552,  October  14, 1973]. 
15. Issuance of market rate intrastate  notes [68 FRB 198 (March 
1982);  see also 12  C.F.R. S217.17.156,  S250.221]. 
16. Underwriting  group  mortgage  life insurance  (credit  life insurance 
directly  related  to real estate loans)[68  FRB 319 (May 1982)]. 
17. Pit arbitrage  (an activity conducted in connection with futures 
commission  merchant  functions)  [68 FRB 776 (December  1982)]. 
18. Issuance  and sale of money  orders  with a face value  of $50,000  or 
higher  [Federal  Reserve Board  letter, April  28, 1983]. 
19. The publication  and sale of personnel  tests and related  materials 
[70  FRB 462 (May 1984)]. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert E. Hall: John  Kareken's  paper  concerns  four  related  questions 
about  the Federal  Reserve's control  over prices and  output: 
1. What  regulations  are  necessary  to give the Federal  Reserve  control 
over nominal  GNP?  Are things  changing  in a way that  lessens control? 
2. Does  the elimination of controls on interest paid on deposits 
diminish  the Federal  Reserve's influence? 
3. Does the  wideningrange  ofpermissable  activities  of banks  threaten 
the Federal  Reserve's control? 
4. Do  interest-rate decontrol and deposit insurance threaten the 
stability  of banking  and  thus, indirectly,  the Federal  Reserve's control? 
Kareken's  answers  are that  the Federal  Reserve has as much  control 
over nominal GNP through  open market  operations as ever, but the 
rising  instability  of banks  may interfere  with the best use of the power. I 
agree  completely  with both conclusions. 
Kareken  poses the questions  in terms  of control  over nominal  GNP. 
I see this as a convenient  way to say "control  over real activity  in some 
short  run  and  the price  level in the long run." I applaud  his sidestepping 
of the controversial  question  of how long it takes  for monetary  action  to 
influence  prices. But I would  take a stronger  stand  than  he does that  the 
ultimate  job of the Federal  Reserve is to control  the price  level. 
On  the issue of the  regulations  needed  to make  open  market  operations 
effective, I think Kareken  takes too narrow  a view. In his world, the 
Federal  Reserve can issue only what  he calls currency,  meaning  Federal 
Reserve notes and reserves. Neither pays interest. As he notes, banks 
would  love to issue their  own currency.  If they are allowed  to, they can 
in effect carry out their own open market  operations. In an economy 
without  regulations  but with zero interest  on currency  and  reserves, the 
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price  level is indeterminate  and the nominal  interest  rate  must  equal  the 
cost of intermediation.  Plainly,  the Federal  Reserve has no control. 
But  this conclusion  is an artifact  of the assumption  of zero interest  on 
currency and reserves, which in turn is the outcome of Kareken's 
adoption of the peculiar "Minnesota convention" of calling reserves 
currency. Nothing stops the Federal Reserve from paying interest on 
reserves;  recently, the Senate Banking  Committee  approved  a bill,  just 
defeated  on the floor, to do exactly that. 
Kareken's  statement  that  a prohibition  on private-sector  intermedia- 
tion is necessary for an effective Federal  Reserve is quite wrong. The 
Federal Reserve can stay ahead of any private creation of financial 
instruments  just by paying  more interest  on reserves. It is quite  unnec- 
essary to  have any regulations against private currency or private 
reserves. The anti-free-market  tone of the paper  is mistaken.  I 
On  the  position  taken  by Albert  Wojnilower  that  interest  rate  decontrol 
has lessened the Federal Reserve's control of disintermediation,  Ka- 
reken  is negative  on two grounds.  First, as a matter  of theory, arbitrage 
in credit  markets  should  keep the real  effects of disintermediation  to low 
levels. Here, he is in conflict  with Bernanke's  work on the depression, 
which identifies  strong  real effects from  the absence of such arbitrage.2 
Second, he finds little evidence of added effectiveness of monetary 
policy during the period 1966-70, when interest rate controls were 
binding. 
With  respect  to the effect  on monetary  policy  of elimination  of controls 
on permissable  activities, it is hard  to disagree  with Kareken's  negative 
conclusion. The pillar of monetary control under today's structure, 
required reserves against transaction deposits, has remained intact 
through all recent changes. Loophole banks have the same reserve 
requirements  as real  banks.  And  whether  or  not  banks  can  sell insurance, 
own real  estate, or underwrite  securities  has no obvious  connection  with 
the control  issue. 
Finally, Kareken  delves into what I see as the liveliest policy issue, 
namely  deposit insurance  and bank stability.  As he points out, we have 
created a monster by letting banks borrow unlimited amounts with 
1. See my "Optimal  Fiduciary  Monetary  Systems,"  Journal  of Monetary  Economics, 
vol. 12  (July  1983),  pp. 33-50. 
2. Ben S. Bernanke,  "Nonmonetary  Effects  of the Financial  Crisis  in the Propagation 
of the Great  Depression,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 73 (June  1983),  pp. 257-76. John H.  Kareken  447 
federal guarantees. Continental  Illinois Bank has demonstrated  that 
these guarantees  apply to all the liabilities of big banks. Only heroic 
stretching  of the rules by federal regulators  has blocked the plans of 
clever California  entrepreneurs  to finance  risky  real  estate deals  through 
insured  deposits, where the shareholders  capture  all the upside profits 
and  the taxpayers  absorb  all the downside  losses. 
I am not sure  I agree  with Kareken's  solutions  to this problem,  which 
are increased requirements  for uninsured  subordinated  liabilities and 
better  government  examination  of bank  assets. The  pressures  that  made 
us bail out the uninsured  creditors  of Continental  Illinois would be no 
less intense after  banks  were required  to change  the legal  form  of part  of 
their  liabilities. And there is no better example  of policy inconsistency 
than  bank  examination.  When  it comes time to close a bank  because an 
honest evaluation gives zero net worth, the government  will always 
think  up a good excuse for keeping  it open. 
I think  a better  general  direction  is to declare  that  the nontransaction 
liabilities  of banks are not special-their  holders  face the same risks as 
holders of corporate  liabilities in general. A default on certificates  of 
deposit should  be handled  just like the bankruptcy  of any corporation- 
an act of Congress should be required  for a bailout. For transaction 
deposits, a foolproof system could be based on 100 percent reserve 
requirements  in Treasury  bills (or interest-bearing  reserves). 
If we do not do something  about bank instability  pretty soon, then 
Kareken  is fully  justified  in his concern  that  keeping  banks  out of trouble 
may seriously interfere with monetary stability, even in a growing, 
healthy  economy. 
James  Tobin: Deregulation,  combined  with  technological  and  entrepre- 
neurial  innovation,  is dramatically  changing  the structure  of banking  and 
related  financial  industries.  John  Kareken  is concerned  with the macro- 
economic implications  of these developments,  as is appropriate  in this 
panel.  The competitive  and  political  struggles  for dominance  or survival 
in the new environment  are very exciting for the participants  and the 
financial  press. But the facile conclusion that the Federal Reserve is 
losing control of macroeconomic  events demands  the kind of skeptical 
analytical  inspection  Kareken  gives it. 
Are Federal Reserve Operations Still Effective? After all, "wolf'  has 
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the Federal  Funds  market,  the emergence  of Eurodollars,  the erosion  of 
Regulation  Q, the growth  of money market  funds, and the invention  of 
numerous  inexpensive ways of substituting  reserve-free  assets paying 
higher  interest rates for conventional  means of payment. In these and 
similar  cases, past, present, and  future,  the Federal  Reserve  might  have 
to make  one-shot adjustments  of its portfolio  to compensate  for changes 
in the demand  for high-powered  money. More durably  important,  the 
Federal Reserve might find that because of changes in the relation  of 
such demand  to interest  rates, GNP, and other macro  variables,  larger 
or smaller open market operations are needed to achieve its policy 
objectives. But as Kareken  correctly  observes, neither  of those modifi- 
cations  of its operating  environment  means  that  the Federal  Reserve  has 
lost control;  neither  the size nor  the variability  of the Federal  Reserve's 
securities  holdings  is a constraint  or policy objective  per se. During  the 
past ten to fifteen  years of rapid  regulatory,  institutional,  and  technolog- 
ical change, the Federal Reserve's grip on the economy seems, if 
anything,  to have tightened,  for better  or worse. 
Kareken  is particularly  concerned  to refute  the view that  the Federal 
Reserve's control  of the macroeconomy  depends  crucially  on its power 
to force disintermediation  or induce re-intermediation,  a power that in 
turn  was thought  to depend  on deposit  interest  rate  ceilings. I think  he is 
essentially right on this point, although  my understanding  of the new 
econometric  test for structural  change  is too weak  to enable  me to derive 
from  his statistical  results  extra  credence  in his argument. 
Probably  the demise of interest  ceilings  alters  the sectoral  impacts  of 
monetary  policies, distributing  them more generally  and concentrating 
them less on residential  construction. But that does not spell loss of 
control  in the aggregate.  Nowadays whether  a saver-lender  holds a time 
certificate  in a bank that in turn holds commercial  paper or the saver- 
lender holds the paper directly does not have much macroeconomic 
significance.  Shifts between intermediaries  and open markets  may, of 
course, alter various monetary  aggregates  and distort the information 
they contain. But so much the worse for them as targets  of monetary 
policy. Kareken,  I notice, never mentions  them;  his test of central  bank 
effectiveness is more meaningful:  ability  to affect nominal  GNP. 
The Never-Never Land of Private Fiat Moneys. The ability of the 
Federal  Reserve to control  nominal  GNP is, according  to Kareken,  safe 
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private  "intermediation"  and (2) imposes, as by reserve requirements, 
demand  for its own currency. 
It  is not  clearto  me  whether  ornot  Kareken  means  these  two conditions 
to be identical, the second a particular  manifestation  of the first. The 
first  main section of his paper  is an excursion to a never-never  land of 
laisser  faire banking  and currency  issue. In that land  a central  bank  can 
do nothing  private agents cannot and will not undo. Perhaps  Kareken 
set forth  on this trip  because he initially  conjectured  that  deregulation  is 
taking  us part  way to the polar  destination  he describes.  If so, he thought 
better  of the conjecture  as he went along. This first  section provides  no 
clues to the consequences  of the trends  actually  in process in the United 
States. Those changes fall far short of  enabling private agents to 
manufacture  base money. Nevertheless Kareken's  ruminations  in this 
part  are  provocative. At least they provoke  me. 
Kareken,  like his colleague  Neil Wallace,  asserts  that  the only reason 
governmental  promises  to pay its own currency  in future  are worth  less 
than the promised  currency  is that the payment  will come in unwieldy 
denominations.  Protecting  its monopoly,  the  government  forbids  private 
intermediation  to repackage  its promised  payments. Kareken  says, for 
example,  that 1,000  privately  issued ninety-day  bearer  bills  for $10  each, 
backed in aggregate  by a $10,000 ninety-day  Treasury  bill, would be 
worth $10,000 right now. The large bill itself would sell at a discount 
equal to the costs of this "intermediation."  Those costs would fix 
nominal  interest  rates, given  that  currency  itself  and  small-denomination 
time bills would bear no interest. Those bills would  be as acceptable  as 
currency in payments. If there were no restrictions on such private 
intermediation,  government currency would have no scarcity value. 
Central  bank  exchanges  of currency  for  future  currency  would  be futile- 
still  another  Modigliani-Miller  theorem. 
No one can say for sure that  this could never happen.  What  societies 
choose as generally  acceptable  media  of exchange  is a matter  of arbitrary 
social convention. If Treasury  bills, of whatever denomination,  were 
generally acceptable, then they would be money, trade at par with 
currency,  and  be generally  acceptable! 
Yet I  suspect that the  sheer deferral of  the obligation in time, 
irrespective  of its denomination,  would still give rise to a discount.  I am 
not aware  of any prohibition  of private  issue of small-denomination  time 
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cites are against the private issue of demand obligations  in currency 
form. There  is a risk  that those private  time obligations  could not in fact 
be redeemed at par on demand until maturity;  this makes them an 
imperfect  substitute  for currency.  (There  is, of course, no governmental 
insurance  of private liabilities  in this laisser faire world.) Once again, 
there will be no such risk if everyone agrees there is none, but the 
potentiality  of risk  in the  absence  of such  consensus  makes  the  consensus 
fragile.  Note, by the way, that even if discounts  on large  Treasury  bills 
reflected  only the costs of change-making  intermediation,  there  is a risk 
that  those costs might  vary within  the maturity  of the bills. 
Observed levels and volatilities of nominal  interest rates cannot be 
explained  by these "intermediation"  costs. Neither can the term struc- 
ture of rates; since costs of breaking  up large denominations  are inde- 
pendent of maturity they would result in a downward-sloping  term 
structure.  Finally,  does Kareken  believe  that  a consol would  have  infinite 
value if only its coupons were in convenient  amounts? 
Answers  to these skeptical  remarks,  I guess, will  take  us to Kareken's 
second condition, government-imposed  demand  for its own currency 
via legal reserve requirements.  I agree that regularly  tested adherence 
to legal reserve requirements  is the key element in the existing system 
of monetary control in the United States. Nevertheless I think that 
Kareken  greatly exaggerates  the consequences of elimination  of these 
requirements-not that  I would  favor such a radical  move. 
In some national  monetary  systems assets other  than  currency,  even 
certain  private  liabilities,  are eligible  to satisfy  reserve requirements;  in 
some cases they have actually  been required  in addition  to or in place of 
currency.  But this has not made  them  the equivalent  of currency  in value 
or function. 
Even without  legal reserve tests, banks  and other  private  intermedi- 
aries operating  a payments  system, whether  paper  or electronic,  would 
have to settle clearing imbalances  with one another. They will adopt 
certain  media  for such  clearings,  and  they  will  want  to hold  some  reserves 
in those media  as precaution  against  coming  up short.  Those media  will 
be in effect high-powered  money, and doubtless  there will be a market 
in overnight  loans of such assets, like the Federal  Funds  market  today. 
Bankers' banks, or perhaps  a dominant  private bank that becomes 
essentially  a central  bank,  will be a natural  locus of clearing  settlements, 
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operations  by those banks  or that  bank  will be effective without  the help 
of legal reserve requirements.  A government  central  bank would have 
no trouble  monopolizing  this role and making  government  base money 
the high-powered  money of the system. 
I have great difficulty  imagining  a thoroughly  laisser faire system of 
fiat  moneys with a common  unit of account. What  would a "dollar"  be 
if it were not defined  by government  currency  or other  official  liabilities 
or by designation of particular  private obligations as legal tender in 
payments  to the government  and  in settlements  of private  contracts? 
For these reasons I do not believe that  without  legal reserve require- 
ments nominal interest rates will be  driven down to  the costs  of 
"intermediation"  and  become impervious  to central  bank  operations. 
How Market  Interest on Deposits and Reserves Affects Monetary 
Policy. I return to more relevant issues. First, what is the effect of 
allowing banks and other intermediaries  to pay market interest on 
deposits, given that reserve requirements  and tests remain  intact, or 
indeed  are extended  to all institutions  that  accept similar  deposits? 
The answer, I think, is pretty clear. An open market  operation  of 
given size has more  effect on nominal  GNP and  on interest  rates than  in 
the previous regime. This does not necessarily mean that the Federal 
Reserve  has more  control,  because the other  side of the same  coin is that 
financial  shocks affecting  the demand  for base money or reserves also 
have bigger  effects on nominal  GNP and interest rates. In a sense the 
Federal  Reserve has more power but may hear louder noise. Anyway 
the Federal Reserve will need to reconsider its old and, of course, 
optimizing  solution to Poole- or Brainard-type  uncertainties.  Since the 
new structure  is a less accommodative  one than  the old, the presumption 
is that  the new optimal  policy rule  will be more  accommodative  than  the 
old-unless  evidence  accumulates  that  in  the  new  regime  financial  shocks 
are  less probable  relative  to real  demand  shocks than  they were before. 
The propositions  of the previous  paragraph  are  based on the fact that 
the abandonment  of ceiling rates on deposits makes  the LM curve-or 
more  precisely  the LH curve,  where  H stands  for  high-powered  money- 
steeper. The reason is very simple, especially if we go along with 
Kareken's  assumption  that intermediation-this time not just making 
change but real-world  intermediation  between deposit liabilities and 
banks' loans and investments-is  a constant-cost  activity. The differ- 
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independent  of the level of interest rates. Thus, variation  of nominal 
GNP  itself must  do most  of the  job of equating  demand  for high-powered 
money to its supply. This conclusion is strengthened  if interest rate 
effects of banks'  demands  for net free reserves are nullified  by indexing 
the Federal Reserve's discount rate to market  rates and by paying a 
similarly  indexed rate on reserves, or just on excess reserves. These 
matters  unfortunately  were not treated  in Kareken's  paper.  ' 
Deregulation,  Bank  Risks, and  Bail-Outs.  Second, Kareken  suggests 
that  even if deregulation  and  the changing  financial  scene do not deprive 
the Federal Reserve of its ability to control nominal  GNP, they may 
weaken the Federal  Reserve's will to take and to maintain  a restrictive 
anti-inflationary  stance. Costly competition  for deposits, combined  with 
a deposit insurance system that transfers  risk to taxpayers, will lead 
banks to take more risk and to get into trouble  more often. The most 
careless banks will set the tone and force the more prudent  to join the 
chase. I am not sure that this scenario is consistent with long-run 
rationality  by bank  managers  in  view of what  happens  to their  reputations 
and their banks even when their depositors, and maybe also their 
stockholders,  are  bailed  out. But  the scenario  rings  true  to recent  history. 
Kareken  might  have added  that  the new regime,  characterized  by greater 
swings  in interest  rates, is likely to make  maturity  intermediation,  which 
used to be the main  business of bankers,  more  perilous  than  before. 
Anyway, as the story continues,  the Federal  Reserve's anti-inflation- 
ary ardor  may  be cooled by fears of the consequences  for bank  liquidity 
and solvency of increases in interest rates. Also the Federal Reserve 
may be more frequently called upon as lender of last resort and be 
compelled  to inject reserves via the discount  window regardless  of the 
current  macroeconomic  situation. 
In my opinion,  as in Kareken's,  monetary  policy need  not  be distorted 
by last-resort  lending.  Deposits drained  from  a suspect  bank  go directly 
or indirectly to other depositories and augment their reserves. This 
redistribution  is expansionary,  because the healthy  beneficiaries  of the 
shift are prepared  to lend out new reserves pretty  much  in their  normal 
fashion, although  their  precautionary  demand  for net free reserves may 
be temporarily  enhanced  by the example  of their  unfortunate  competitor. 
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Meanwhile,  extraordinary  borrowing  at the Federal  Reserve limits the 
contractionary  effects of the deposit loss on the troubled  bank;  it does 
not have to sell as many  assets as the deposit-gaining  banks  are enabled 
and prepared  to buy. However, the net expansionary  effect of these 
events can easily be counteracted  by offsetting  part  of the expansion  of 
borrowed  reserves by reduction  in the supply  of unborrowed  reserves. 
Economywide consequences of failures of large banks have been 
greatly  exaggerated  in the rhetoric  of the industry,  the news media,  and 
the concerned government  officials. Words like dominoes, runs, and 
panics conjure up memories of the early 1930s. The analogy thus 
suggested  is false. In the 1980s  we do not confront  a wholesale  run  from 
banks to currency,  and if we did the Federal  Reserve would now have 
no trouble  supplying  the desired  currency  without  curtailing  the supply 
of bank reserves. The runs we have seen are from troubled  banks to 
other banks; these do not destroy the aggregate  reserve base. Or they 
are from bank deposits to market instruments,  domestic or foreign. 
Contrary,  evidently, to widespread  misunderstandings,  such flight  can- 
not destroy any reserves either. The worst they can do is to force some 
disintermediation,  in which banks sell to their  erstwhile  depositors  the 
market  instruments  they now prefer. That may be bad for bank share- 
holders,  but it is not a social disaster. 
For  these reasons,  the extraordinary  solicitude  of the Federal  Reserve 
and the  FDIC for the  survival of  mismanaged  large banks seems 
misplaced.  I agree  with  Kareken  that  the  extension  of insurance  coverage 
to uncovered  deposits  is a bad  precedent.  His suggestion  of subordinated 
liabilities appears sound to me. One form these could take is that of 
deposits explicitly  uninsured. 
General Discussion 
Several  discussants  expanded  on how deregulation  may have altered 
the effectiveness of monetary  policy. Richard  Cooper  argued  that  just 
because deregulation  does not render the money multiplier  zero, as 
Kareken  notes, this does not imply that making  the multiplier  smaller 
leaves policy unimpaired.  Policy actions may have undesirable  side 
effects which are ignored  within the historical  range  of policy actions. 
But these side effects may become important  if much larger policy 
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governing  the side effects is nonlinear  so that they become dispropor- 
tionately  larger.  Thus Cooper  reasoned  we should  be concerned  about 
whether  deregulation  will cause needed  open market  operations  to have 
undesirable  side effects on bond markets,  foreign exchange markets, 
and bank solvency. Ralph  Bryant  added  that there has been something 
of a competition  among  countries  to reduce supervision  and regulation 
of international  financial  transactions.  This, together  with  the increasing 
integration  of international  financial  markets, may make the effect of 
open market  operations  on the national  economy  less predictable.  More 
generally,  a less predictable  money multiplier,  which  may  be implied  by 
these and other regulatory  changes, reduces  the effectiveness of mone- 
tary  policy. William  Brainard  noted that  any regime  change  necessarily 
implies a loss of information  to economic agents about how the world 
works. The adjustment  costs to economic  agents  that  accompany  dereg- 
ulation and the resulting changes in financial structure  ought to be 
balanced  against  any benefits  of such changes. 
There was disagreement  over whether deregulation,  in addition  to 
increasing  the volatility of interest rates, has also raised the level of 
interest rates. Robert  Gordon  reasoned  that, if deregulation  has steep- 
ened the LM curve, interest rates would be higher  for a given shift in 
the IS curve. Lawrence  Summers  noted that  the effects of deregulation 
on previously  unregulated  rates was theoretically  ambiguous.  Further- 
more, the argument  resting on a steeper LM curve would imply short 
rates  would  rise relative  to long  rates  because  the latter  were determined 
by real equilibrium  conditions  rather  than  by the LM curve. This tilt in 
the yield curve had not been observed. Finally, he noted that  if deregu- 
lation were an important  part of the explanation  for today's high real 
rates, the stock market  should  have fallen  rather  than  risen  as it has. 
Barry  Bosworth  agreed  with Robert  Hall that  banking  reforms  ought 
to accompany  banking  deregulation  in order  to make  monetary  changes 
an  acceptable  policy instrument.  With  deregulation,  the  greater  volatility 
in interest rates has resulted in more banks being declared  insolvent. 
Deregulation  has increased  the frequency  of cases in which the Federal 
Reserve has had to choose between sustained  anti-inflationary  policies 
and  the financial  health  of its constituency,  the banking  community.  To 
remove this conflict, the authorities  could require  an increase in the 
capitalization  of banks  or an increase  in deposit  insurance  requirements 
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In his reply, Kareken  agreed  with Hall's and Bosworth's  point about 
the need for reforms,  but he disagreed  with their  suggested  solution.  If a 
bank  determines  its portfolio  according  to economic  theory, that  theory 
gives only the optimal share of wealth to be held in each asset. This 
means  that  unless  portfolio  payoffs  are  arbitrarily  restricted,  the amount 
of capital required has no effect on the probability  of bankruptcy. 
Kareken  rejected  Tobin's approach  to analyzing  the deregulation  issue. 
Underlying probability distributions of  returns and therefore asset 
demands  must  change  when  regulatory  policy  changes,  but  that  is ignored 
in Tobin's  approach. 